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Following the theories applied in macroeconomic debt crisis models is equal to assume that the 
movement between one period lagged levels of budget deficits and current growth are strongly 
correlated, which is disproved by the post-war period as most of the developed countries show high 
levels of debt, low risk premiums and positive growth rates. In order to be able to break down a 
purely direct effect of debt on growth, it is helpful to look for alternative explanations for why debt 
stocks vary over time and across economically similar countries. Political economy seems being a 
promising field of research. As to my knowledge, recent articles focus on the empirical  
investigation on how political surroundings influence economic activity or investment behaviour. 
The novel contribution to that field of analysis is is to thoroughly check relations between debt, 
growth and political factors separately and simultaneously in the descriptive analysis. A better 
understanding of how those variables do interact improves the model choice for technical analysis, 
or may even enable the process of modelling macroeconomics into a political economy framework.
If we are able to find some political factor that has explanatory power in predicting the 
variation in the paths of debt and growth over time (or across countries), we can luckily conclude 
that there is no one-way or two-way correlation between debt and growth, but rather another 
underlying factor that causes both to either move along or to diverge. If such a behaviour can be 
shown, policy-makers should revise current use of an uniform public spending policy exclusively 
aiming at reducing the stock of debt on the one hand, and stimulating growth on the other hand, and
rather look at what lies behind – what really determines economic activity. Specifically, I try to 
explore whether strategic use of debt by governments, political competition or a mixture of both can
explain the variations in debt and growth between 1950 and 2010 for a sample of 16 European 
countries.
The main strategy is to conduct thorough analysis of the panel data to convey the idea that  
accumulation of debt to some degree is due to political forces within a country or region, and thus 
predetermined to be heterogeneous across countries. Following that claim, it is obvious that debt 
thresholds merely lie at the same level for all countries, suggesting that any consolidation policy has
to be tailored to each and single country, given the surrounding economical situation. The first step 
is to look naively at differences of average growth rates and debt shares across time and countries 
which helps arguing against Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) who state that debt levels above 90 percent
of GDP are always harmful. To be able to test the impact of the political environment, the pure 
economic panel data is merged with a set of political variables. To start with only two factors are 
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further investigated, the political index of conservatism and the degree of political competition, as 
they are building on the findings of two influential papers by Besley et al. (2010) and  Pettersson-
Lidbom (2001). The political index provides information about the ideological position of 
governments which enables to investigate how instability of political platforms induces incumbent 
governments to use debt strategically today in order to constrain opposing parties in the future; this 
idea and two model-versions have been put forward by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Persson 
and Svensson (1989). The former puts emphasis on the idea that heterogeneity in political views 
lead to that no agreement over the allocation of public spending on different types of goods is 
reached, while the latter highlight disagreement over the level of public expenditures. In order to 
decide which of the two models fits better to data that includes several countries some exercise 
regarding the shrinking government effect (Battaglini and Barseghyan, 2012) is included. This is 
done in order to check the well-known crowding out effect of debt on public good provision - 
“higher debt implies higher [future] tax distortions; each party is less willing to spend on public 
goods if if it inherits a higher public debt” (Persson and Tabelini, 2002 p.352). The other variable is 
political competition which refers to the distance of the vote share of a governing coalition to the 
share implied by an equal probability of winning the election, i.e. perfect competition; Besley et al. 
(2010) find empirically for US states that political competition can be seen in the sense of market 
competition which has a positive impact on growth. As they do not concern debt, much of the 
thoughts, arguments, conclusions and revisions throughout the paper concerning that side of the 
picture within their framework are elaborated purely out of my own views on how economic 
mechanisms work. As a last step more variables are included to further characterize the political 
environment.
Having set out main simple correlations between the political variables, debt and growth 
using OLS estimation leaves plenty of room to criticize the validity of the results. Hence it is 
important to check their robustness by testing several model specifications against each other, so 
that one is left with the most appropriate choice available. The last stage is to connect all the 
empirical results plausibly to a political model. This is done by specifying that heterogeneity in 
public spending and the tax-debt schedule is due to the fact that the society is made up by taxpayers 
and pensioners who have different preferences what regards the tax rate, the amount of debt issued 
and the type of public good that is provided. Spending on R&D is the only source of growth. 
If one assumes that debt is issued in order to finance some non-trivial share of all 
governmental spending, then it seems rather odd to not incorporate a measure for how strong this 
incentive is. Further, the decision to take up debt then is determined within each period, while of 
course past choices are affecting the outcome today, and therefore the lag of expenditure is not 
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added. The contingency on prior decisions is captured by the lag of GDP per capita instead, being 
one of the  explanatory factors for why debt has been growing since then. 
The main software used to conduct statistical calculations and to plot graphs is Stata 12.0 Special 
Edition. Prior to the data analysis I relied on the spreadsheet in Open Office in order to collect and 
manage the data series. This program has also been used to depict histograms in order to make a 
direct connection to Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), the paper that mostly motivated me to write a 
thesis within the scope of macroeconomic heterogeneity within Europe. 
The first strong conclusion is that the relationship between debt and growth appears not being linear
over the whole range of debt levels. This is especially true for levels between 30 and 90 percent of 
GDP. Further, the evolution of debt is clearly distinct for different parts of  Europe, though the 
pattern of business cycles is not. For the South, which includes countries like Greece and Italy, a 10 
percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio reduces growth rates by 0.4 percent, which 
amounts to the double size of the average effect regarding the whole sample. This suggests that any 
theory that is able to plausibly link heterogeneity in the evolution of debt to some underlying factor 
that differs across countries, but possibly also effects growth, has something to add to the 
understanding on how political economics and economic aggregates interact. I found two 
candidates that have this feature, and hopefully future research, with better data resources available,
will either confirm or reject my thoughts. 
As it is true for debt, both the degree of conservatism and the environment of political 
competition are quite distinct across European regions.  Scandinavian countries are those with the 
most liberal governments and display the highest degree of competition. The heterogeneity is even 
more obvious when looking at the interaction of the political index with debt: For all regions except
the South more liberal governments are associated with a reduction in the stock of debt. A change 
from a right-centre to a left-centre complexion causes the debt-to-GDP ratio to decline between 9 to
11 percent, depending on the region and when no other controls are included. Regarding the South, 
the same shift indicates an accumulation of debt by 17 percent. Investigating the strategical debt 
hypothesis for the whole sample of countries leads to the conclusion that a one point decrease in 
conservatism is assumed to lower debt shares on average by 2.9 percent. Growth rates are not 
affected on average, though economic performance is stimulated in Scandinavia by 1.8 percent and 
dampened in the South by 1.6 percent when switching from a right-centre to a left-centre coalition. 
This may suggest that liberal and conservative parties may have different preferences over 
government spending and public finance. In the final regression though, that includes all political 
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variables, lagged values of debt and growth and fixed effects, the political index no longer has 
explanatory power to forecast debt. That no significant effect on debt is found has not be interpreted
as being an evidence against the idea elaborated in the thesis. In my opinion, since debt stocks have 
been growing over time, are highly determined by lagged values and possibly many other country-
specific factors, it still is in line with Alesina and Tabellini's (1990) assumption that debt is used 
strategically on the provision of different public goods, which in reality implies that overspending 
always always present. On the other side, an ideological shift of the same size as above is associated
with growth rates that are 0.9 percent higher, a much more realistic estimate of the impact than 
without any controls. 
Competition, the other candidate, leads to no clear conclusion using simple OLS regression. 
On average debt stocks seem to grow by 2.2 percent for a 0.1 change in the value of the competition
measurement, though the estimate is mainly driven by a sub-set of countries. On its own, this 
finding supports the reasoning that more competition reflects a more unstable environment in terms 
of which party will be in power the next period. The impact on growth is not statistically 
significant, indicating that also the estimated impact on debt is flawed. Indeed, including more 
explanatory variables leads to developments that are in line with a simple probabilistic voting model
and competitive market theory: policy converges towards the social optimum, having a low stock of
debt in a growth-enhancing environment. The effect on debt is, as it was for the political index, not 
significant. Growth rates however are stimulated by about 0.7 percent per decimal change in the 
degree of competition. Though some of the other political variables show significant coefficients, 
they neither do change the stories that are told by the political index and political competition, nor 
do they add anything new. 
In the last regression, that uses expenditure and the lag of GDP per capita instead of lagged values 
of  debt and growth. the coefficient on the lag of GDP per capita is precisely estimated close to zero;
this finding confirms that this measure of citizens' welfare is not driving macroeconomic 
performance when country and time fixed effects are controlled for. This results also reinforces the 
idea of political variables as being determinants of those macroeconomic variables the government 
can control (debt) or influence (growth through governmental investment and consumption). 
The degree of conservatism as well as political competition play a role in explaining growth.
An anticipated change from a left-centred to a right-centred government is associated with a rise in 
growth rates by 1.2 percentage points. This is in line with theoretical predictions that more liberal 
parties do engage more in growth-enhancing activities than conservative governments. Competition 
however has a negative impact on growth, a 0.1 percent movement towards zero leads to a 0.9 
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decline in growth. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative as well, which implies that a 
change to a more liberal government or a reduction of overall competition are substitutes, or as 
interpreted above, more liberal governments are less responsive to competition, and can be labelled 
as being more strong in terms of ideology.
Debt is increasing with the political index, though the size of the coefficient is not credible. 
A change from a left-centre to a right-centre complexion is associated with an increase of about 29 
percent. Hence, from this result  one should not draw the conclusion that the strategic debt 
hypothesis is not valid. More conform with the argumentation made along the thesis is to recognize 
that collinearity between conservative preferences and their main policy instrument, expenditure, is 
causing the significant switch in sign and size. In the sense that the coefficient on CPG_01 
expresses the fact that more conservative governments prefer higher public spending that is not 
related to growth-enhancing investments, clearly debt is increasing more whenever such a 
government is in place. Through the strong identification of conservative parties with higher 
expenditure and debt levels clearly one effect incorporates the other, leading to a strange estimate 
for the other.
Overall, the analysis gives empirical evidence that heterogeneous preferences across parties do 
matter for why and how much debt is accumulated, as well as how growth-oriented public policy is 
conducted. Behaviour is affected by political uncertainty, as put forward by probabilistic voting 
models. The other dimension, political competition shows more inconclusive impacts on debt, 
though the findings are all justified by economic considerations; this may simply reflect that 
political competition has not so clear cut implications as market competition has – in the latter 
prices do incorporate preferences, and it is easy for individuals to base decisions on the information 
prices reveal. What regards politics, many other dimensions then just relative vote shares do 
determine outcomes; ideology, popularity, some sort of “market” power that cannot be eliminated 
through subsidies, and of course the feedback from politics to the economy and the other way 
around are setting constraints on behaviour, compared to the idea of free markets and an invisible 
director that coordinates beneficial trade decisions.
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1 Review of existing literature
Starting with the Financial Crisis in 2007, the world economy, and especially Europe's activity level
have been trapped in decline. Many economists have been struck by the intensity that even solid 
economies had been hit with, mostly due to discretionary policy to stimulate growth and to avoid 
the threat of sudden stops. 
The almost unquestioned view that developed countries today are so well advanced what 
regards stability of the political and institutional systems, so that the probability of Western 
governments to default could be neglected, was evidently prominent after the switch to independent
central banks following a Taylor rule – as a result fiscal policy got pushed into the background, 
while monetary policy has been assumed to be able to smooth business cycles all alone. If that was 
true, then debt, accumulated up to that day, would mostly be constant as share of GDP or even 
decline over time; and since governments were able to handle high debt until now, the reasoning 
goes, there would also be no problem in the future, holding the political and institutional 
environment stable. Unfortunately, the role of financial markets in nowadays economic transactions 
has merely been captured fully. Especially the Euro-crisis has been – and probably still is – another 
example of how expectations and other factors than economic fundamentals do determine the 
destiny of countries.
Upon the huge discrepancy between what theory predicts and how reality turned out to be, 
economists are trying to get back on track. But when and where did the field of economics left the 
path? Some, like Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) pledge for the need of governments to commit to a 
fixed ceiling of debt levels. Others oppose the idea of well-defined thresholds of debt that do 
determine growth. The rest of this Section presents first several papers that deal with thresholds 
theoretically and empirically and highlights the disagreement on this topic among economists. The 
second part looks at explanations for changes in debt beyond a macroeconomic perspective and 
introduces the role of policy incentives.
1.1 Opinions on debt thresholds
„Growth in a Time of Debt“ by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) is at the core of the recent debate on 
austerity policies. They suggest that average growth rates drop significantly when the debt to GDP 
ratio does exceed 90%. 
Overall, the exercise of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) does emphasize some kind of 
correlation between debt and growth. Regarding the poor data however – it is not possible to 
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distinct foreign hold from public debt for the advanced countries – the identified thresholds may be 
hiding other underlying structural causes. 
Moreover, nothing can be said about causality due to the purely descriptive nature of the 
analysis, and hence policy recommendations should be done carefully. Without controlling for 
country-specific characteristics inferences on average growth rates have to be expected to be 
plagued by omitted variable bias, as some countries never had higher debt levels than 70%, while 
other countries solely are found in the high-debt category. Surely those countries must be different 
from each other in some aspect that led to different behaviour in accumulating debt over time.
„The impact of high government debt on economic growth and its channels: An empirical 
investigation for the Euro area“ by Checerita-Westphal and Rother (2012) does reinforce the 
findings by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) for 12 European countries, over a time span of 40 years. „It 
unveils a concave (inverted U-shape) relationship between the public debt ratio and the economic 
growth rate with the debt turning point at about 90–100% of GDP“ (Checerita-Westphal and Rother,
2012, p.1403). Due to reverse causation issues they apply instrumental variables in the estimation 
process, using either lagged values of debt or the average of the other countries' debt levels. 
Despite that Checerita-Westphal and Rother (2012) do identify some of the channels through
which debt affects growth in a non-linear manner (public investment, private saving and total factor 
productivity), their results may be flawed by the fact that those variables do enter the regression 
separately, without interaction terms.
It took only a few months for opposing views to come up. In „Government Debt and Economic 
Growth: Overreaching Claims of  Debt “Threshold“ Suffer from Theoretical and Empirical Flaws“ 
Irons and Bivens (2010) do warn explicitly on drawing quick political decisions based on the results
reported in „Growth in  Time of Debt“, especially because they are purely statistical, and not 
grounded in economic theory: „There is no compelling theoretical reason why the stock of debt at a 
given point in time should harm contemporaneous economic growth“ (Irons and Bivens, 2010, p.2).
The way of causality that Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) appeared to claim, from debt to growth, 
seems totally misjudged in the eyes of Irons and Bivens (2010): what they found for the U.S. in 
recent decades is rather a relationship of debt and growth that is running from lower activity to debt 
accumulation than the other way around, supported by the data applied in „Growth in a Time of 
Debt“ (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010). Though, the data on gross debt (opposed to debt held by the 
public) itself is criticized as being the wrong „measure“.
The lack of use of relevant economic theory  in “Growth in a Time of Debt” (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
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2010) is captured by a discussion on what actually is related to growth – levels of total debt or the 
change in debt, i.e. budget deficits? „Most studies that claimed to have found a link between rising 
government borrowing and rising interest rates find only a link between deficits and interest rates, 
not interest rates and debt“ (Irons and Bivens, 2010, p.3).
Another harsh critic of Reinhart and Rogoff's (2010) results, especially the notion on underlying 
causality, was formulated by Herndon, Ash and Pollin (2013). He and his co-authors point out in 
„Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff“ 
that a „necessary condition for a stylized fact is accuracy. We replicate RR and find that coding 
errors, selective exclusion of available data, and unconventional weighting of summary statistics 
lead to serious errors“ (Herndon, Ash and Pollin, 2013, p.2 f.). 
Using corrected average growth rates, they do find a significant drop in average growth 
within the first category, where debt is lower than 30% of GDP; however, discontinuity around the 
90% level is not evident. The clear cut conclusion is that austerity politics should be revised.
Further, some thoughts around the strength of the relationship between growth and debt are raised. 
In my opinion, such considerations have to be made in order to identify areas that are prone for 
omitted variable bias in empirical tests. 
In order to draw a more complete picture of the relationship between debt and growth, and on the 
ongoing debate on thresholds and causality,  that have been suggested by the papers listed above, it 
seems worthwhile to sum up the theoretical framework used, and assumptions made by the authors 
to be able to evaluate their results.
As an early theorem, the Ricardian equivalence (Barro, 1974) states that higher government 
spending or lower taxes today have to be followed by contractionary policies in the future. Having 
this in mind, rational agents will not alter their optimal consumption path. However, one of the 
following unrealistic assumptions has to hold: Either the agents are assumed to live forever in order 
to experience both the tax cut and the raise in tax rates, or every legislature period is seen as being 
in a new state of the world, so that governments always have to hand over neutral budgets at the end
of each period. Moreover, taxes are assumed to be of a lump-sum type, which in reality do not exist,
and growth is absent – thus, even though it introduces the notion of a binding inter-temporal budget 
constraint, Ricardian equivalence is not suited to reveal causality between debt and growth. 
Nevertheless, the assumption still is incorporated in growth models used today, and thus one has to 
be careful in neglecting the flaws it might bring into the design of an empirical test.
Another problem of macro models is the simplifying assumption that public expenditures often are 
8
considered to have no influence on welfare. The reason why is that economists are interested in 
impacts of public debt per se, and not in the interaction with other variables. In reality however, 
public money may both go to utility-enhancing or -reducing activities, implying that the 
composition of public investments does matter when evaluating the effect on growth.
Lysandrou (2013, p.4) and Holland (2007) connect Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano's (2003) theory
of debt intolerance to the standard debt sustainability analysis (Holland, 2007, p.7 f.):
(1) D(t +1) = [1+ r(t)]D(t) -TB(t)
where D(t) is the country’s external debt at time t, TB is its current account, and r is the interest paid by 
the country on its external debt. In steady-sate one can express the following relationship:
(2) TB /Y = (r - g)(D/Y)
where TB /Y is the steady-state ratio of the current account to output needed to stabilize the external debt 
ratio at D/Y.
In this model, both the interest rate paid on debt, determined by expectations on the probability of 
defaulting, and growth depend crucially on the current fiscal performance of governments: Lower 
growth provokes higher interest rates. But higher interest rates mean the existing debt stock being a 
higher burden, which calls for even higher expenditures, and an even larger current deficit. If 
borrowing cannot be done easily, repayments of debt have to be financed through taxes, which have
an adverse effect on economic activity – this may be the start of a self-fulfilling debt crisis.
It is worth mentioning explicitly that not the size of total debt is the reason for crises to occur, but 
the fact that current deficits do crowd-out private investment (Bivens and Irons, 2010, p.2 f.)
On the conflict of causality, I make use of Afonso and Furceri's (2010, p.518) words to describe the 
main tension in theory:
One  of  the  frequently  quoted  stylised  facts  of  public  sector  economics  is  that  of
“Wagner's Law” about the long-run tendency for public expenditure to grow relative to
some national income aggregate such as GDP.5 This implies that public expenditure
can be treated as an outcome, or an endogenous factor, rather than a cause of growth in
national income. On the other hand, Keynesian propositions treat public expenditure as
an exogenous factor,  which could be utilised as a policy instrument.  In the former
approach, the causality runs from national income to public expenditure whereas in the
latter  proposition,  causality  runs  from public  expenditure  via  domestic  demand  to
national income. Evidence concerning this topic is not conclusive.6 Additionally, Lucas
(1988) argues that public investment in education increases the level of human capital
and this can be seen as a main source of long-run economic growth. Moreover, Barro
(1990) mentions the importance of government expenditure in public infrastructure for
economic  growth  and  Romer  (1990)  stresses  the  relevance  of  research  and
development expenditure. Therefore, composition of public spending is also a relevant
issue,  and  if  the  aim is  to  promote  growth,  the  focus  should  be  put  on  the  more
productive items of the budget.
  
  
As a last area of issues related to the prevailing uncertainty regarding if historical inferences can be 
made on the relationship between debt and growth is yet mentioned by Afonso and Furceri (2010) 
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in their paper on „Government size, composition, volatility and economic growth“. They dislike the
almost homogeneous use of long time-series, despite the fact that countries did not share common 
trends over the last century (Afonso and Furceri, 2010, p.520): 
In  particular,  regarding  fiscal policy,  over long time spans the level of government
spending and income are likely to be influenced by demographics,  in  particular an
increasing share of elderly people. Thus, errors in the growth variable will affect GDP,
demographics,  and  taxes  or  government  spending.  As  a  result,  the  independent
variables  government  revenue  or  government  spending  as  a  share  of  GDP,  are
correlated with the error term in the growth regression, and this will produce biased
estimates.
Having those recent adjustments in the field of economics in mind, students graduating in this 
turbulent time should be aware of that a cure still not is found, and that the solution might not be 
identified by using the tool-kit available to economists today. Clearly, many attempts in improving 
models, as to capture endogenous decisions to repay debt or self-fulfilling expectations, did emerge 
the recent years, and show that our discipline is not standing still.
The baseline however is that we cannot state anything about in which direction the causality 
goes: Do higher levels of debt cause lower growth rates, as many economists and politicians claim 
in the vein of the Euro-crisis, or is low economic activity the reason for governmental debt, which 
clearly would emphasize that cuts in public expenditures is harmful to reduce the burden of debt?
To find an answer to that question one would have to look closer when debt is accumulated; another
problem might be that the reasons for taking up loans did change a lot during the last century – from
warfare to welfare - and so did probably also the countries – from economical strong to weak 
nations.
But what if we don't have to take a stand on causality? This is simply done by abandoning a 
macroeconomic view and rather checking if preferences of politicians and government composition 
can tell a part of the story – thus we move towards political economy. 
During the recent years attention in the discipline of macroeconomics upon the relationship between
government debt and economic growth was directed towards debt levels, rather than the current 
account deficit – which, in a Keynesian view, has been identified to cause the economy to slow 
down through the channel of rising risk premiums on bonds. However, the chain of effects lying 
behind is not altered: higher accumulation of debt influences growth rates negatively in the long 
run, which will feedback in resulting even higher debt levels. Following the theories applied in debt 
crisis models is equal to assume that the correlation between one period lagged levels of budget 
deficits and current growth are almost perfectly correlated, which is disproved by the post-war 
period, as most of the developed countries show high levels of debt, low risk premiums and positive
growth rates.
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In order to be able to break down a purely direct effect of debt on growth, it is 
helpful to look for alternative explanations for why debt stocks vary over time and across 
economically similar countries. Political economy seems being a promising field of research: If we 
are able to find some political factor that not only does influence public spending behaviour and 
growth related fundamentals – like unemployment or inflation targets –  but also has explanatory 
power in predicting the variation in the paths of debt and growth over time (or across countries), we
can luckily conclude there is no one-way or two-way correlation between debt and growth, but 
rather an underlying factor that causes both to either move along or to diverge. If such a behaviour 
can be shown, policy-makers should revise current use of public spending policy exclusively aiming
at reducing the stock of debt on the one hand, and stimulating growth on the other hand, and rather 
look at what is behind – what really determines economic activity – so that it is thinkable that 
austerity policies are gainful for some countries, but disastrous for other countries, and that the 
success of any measurement is not totally founded in economic fundamentals, geographical 
features, cultural attitudes – think of the argument that Southern Europeans are lazy – but also the 
political environment just around the election date – which can be very different for Portugal and 
Italy for instance.
1.2 Approaches from Political Economics
“Why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time-inconsistent preferences” 
(Persson and Svensson, 1989) takes as given that the party 1 in power will be replaced by its 
opponent 2, which favours higher levels of public spending. They then ask, how this will affect the 
governments decisions on taxes and borrowing. More precisely, Persson and Svensson (1989) 
model decision making in an environment of time-inconsistent preferences, i.e. the government 
cares more about how the other party may behave in the period just before the replacement, but with
time-consistent constraints, i.e. the tax base remains constant. This implies that, if 1 would stay in 
power the next period, there is no need to alter behaviour, and preferences will be time-consistent. 
Or, conversely, inherited debt (from party 1) potentially influences the successors optimal choice 
regarding taxes and borrowing after the change of governments.
Their main conclusion is that in threat of being not re-elected, parties that would restrain 
from accumulating high levels of debt stock if they were re-elected eventually will choose to issue 
more debt in order to force the successor towards less expansive government spending. A liberal 
government reasons in a similar strategic way, however, it will keep the stock of debt smaller than 
its own preferred level to induce a conservative successor to not cut down government spending 
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excessively. Thus, in equilibrium, the realized debt stock will lie in between the preferred levels of 
the two parties, of which one or the other would occur in the case of having a singe eternal-living 
social planner. This rests on forward-looking governments, that use debt strategically, and that 
inherited debt does influence a succeeding government.
“A positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt” by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) focuses 
on the motivation of debt accumulation in order to minimize distortive effects of taxes when 
providing public goods. The conceptual difference to Persson and Svensson (1989) lies in the  
modelling of choices over the composition of government spending rather than the amount of 
spending. Parties are different with respect to preferences over two goods. 
Analysing voting behaviour leads to the conclusion that a democratic process, in which 
voters exhibit different preferences over the composition of public goods, yields positive levels of 
debt, in comparison to a benevolent social planner who assigns equal weights to each individual in 
the population. More accurately, the greater the discrepancy between the parties' preferences over 
public goods, i.e. the higher party polarization, the larger the negative effect on budget deficits 
caused by not entirely internalized costs of leaving debt to the future.
To state in short the difference between the two papers, notice that in Persson and Svensson (1989) 
one is able to differentiate between more and less expansionary regimes, while in Alesina and 
Tabellini (1990) a government shift induces both parties in the same way to run deficits.
The empirical work that can be seen as a source of inspiration is a paper by Pettersson-Lidbom from
2001. He conducts “An Empirical Investigation of the Strategic Use of Debt” in order to test if one, 
none or a mixture of the two hypotheses stated above do occur in reality using a single regression 
equation. The conceptual framework is to use a political variable, i.e. electoral outcome in Swedish 
municipality elections, as a proxy to check how variability in debt reacts to changes in the political 
environment.  
Advantages of using within-country data is the fact that elections are held simultaneously, 
the equal constitutional setting under which all local governments act and the possibility to clearly 
identify each party's political standpoint. Those aspects cannot be fully met when using cross-
country data and any attempt of comparing unequalized election cycles, election systems and the 
political index of sister-parties in different nations must be seen as an approximation of real 
qualitatively differences between democracies, and hence, researchers should be aware of 
measurement issues even before setting out an empirical approach that tries to compare causal 
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effects of political factors on the real economy.
Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) is aware of the fact that “the probability of defeat might be endogenous” 
(p.574). In order to handle this problem, he uses ex-ante expectations to explain ex-post election 
outcomes, and uses the fitted value of this regression as the instrumental variable in the second 
stage regression of debt on election results. This approach depends crucially on identifying all 
relevant variables that do form expectations by forehand.
As a main conclusion, he does find support for Persson and Svensson's (1989) explanation in
the data: “a right-wing government [conservative] increases its level of debt by 15 percent, whereas 
a left-wing government [liberal] decreases its debt by 11 percent if they are both certain of being 
replaced” (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2001, p.582). In general, around 65 percent of the variation in debt is
explained in his model, in which existing debt stocks is identified as the main factor of the path of 
debt evolution.
As an alternative proxy for the probability of a government change he used the vote share of the 
party in power. The results are not altered, which also is true when comparing stable municipalities 
with those that experience numerous changes of the party in power. In my opinion, designing 
political change with the help of vote shares or frequency is easier to conduct in a panel data like 
mine, where observations on ex-ante expectations may suffer from different handling of that kind of
information across countries. 
There are several problems that may occur when adopting a similar approach as Pettersson-
Lidbom (2001). I seek to state anything concerning the relationship between debt and growth. Thus,
I have to take a stand on the possibility of leaving out important variables that in fact do determine 
debt and the political variable, introducing another form for endogeneity. All these concerns will be 
dealt with later on.
An elegant way has been chosen by Besley et al. (2010) which is elaborated thoroughly in their 
paper on “Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US”.
In line with the accepted view in economics that monopolistic market power hinders growth, Besley
et al. (2010) set out the thought that concentrated political power suppresses economic activity in a 
similar manner. They suppose that swing voters first are important for determining the equilibrium 
policy when a certain degree of competition between two organized parties is reached – the degree 
of decisiveness associated with these voters then leads politicians to announce growth-enhancing 
i.e. low-tax policies instead of platforms that solely is targeted towards their devoted electorate. 
This implies that political competition and not preferences over policies actually determine which 
program will be implemented. 
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This way of thinking of policy outcomes is quite interesting as it captures well the concept 
of a competitive market, just transferred to the realm of politics. Moreover, we do find quite a few 
papers that elaborate that issue empirically, and thus it seems worthwhile and promising to follow 
the theory of political competition and to test it for other data than that on the US. To sum up the 
findings, Besley et al. (2010) basically do find strong evidence for the theory they set out, i.e. 
political competition induces policy-makers to implement pro-growth programs.
2 Growth and public debt
In order to gain some overview the natural way to start is to dwell a bit on the summary statistics 
found in Table 1 Column 1 and 2. Average growth since 1950 was close to 3.3 percent, and the 
distance to that level for different regions, as will be specified below, ranges between -0.5 and +0.6, 
so the deviations seem quite symmetric. Such differences in growth rates may be well explained 
with the idea of accelerated growth the father away the economy is from steady state. The fact that 
expenditure on R&D is the lowest for Southern countries like Greece and Italy , which grouped 
together had the highest average growth over the sample period, conforms the notion of a 
technology inventor and a (poorer) technology copier, as elaborated  by Weil (2009, Chapter 8 and 
9). Average debt levels are more volatile, however, below 50 percent of GDP. This may be 
surprising when we are in a time where debt almost has become a too high burden to bear for some 
of the European countries. One should not forget that much of the current debt stocks have been 
accumulated the last two decades, a time when frontiers opened, global trade speeded up, monetary 
policy regimes shifted, less fiscal stabilization policy was conducted and a uniform currency that 
insured access to cheap credit was introduced.
2.1 Examining the relationship between growth rates and debt shares
The starting point of the analysis makes use of the data on debt that has been constructed by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), which is available online as four xls-files called “Debt to GDP  Ratios 
Country X-X”. To be more specific, I picked their series on total government debt as share of GDP 
to represent the evolution of debt between 1950 and 2010. The choice against alternative measures 
of debt, like for instance external debt, simply follows from the fact that these data are not available 
for many countries or a long period1. Moreover, there are several reasons for why I considered only 
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20 OECD countries as an appropriate sample2. First, the data set is quite flawed what regards the 
completeness of time series, i.e. for some countries information dates back to the 18th century, while
for some countries, like the former Soviet Union countries, we do merely not dispose of any data 
prior to the 1990s. A second consideration regards the nature of the data – nominal values, though, it
is more appropriate to include real values. Coherent data on historical rates of inflation already is 
hard enough to find for developed countries, and in my opinion it is better to be more accurate than 
to include a lot of data that only blurs  possible correlation, or even worse, leads to wrong 
conclusions. Data on historic inflation, except Australia3, are taken from “Worldwide Inflation 
Data”. Inflation is measured as the CPI of December between two subsequent years. For my 
purpose of looking at growth rates, I find it more appropriate to consider a change in inflation at a 
given point of a year more appropriate than comparing average inflation rate for a given year with 
another time period. Constructing real value of GDP however implies loss of data, as the series on 
inflation often not start in 1950, but at 1956 or later. Throughout the analysis, I will check whether 
findings change upon moving from nominal to real values; if this is not the case, represented results 
are conducted using the longer data set with nominal variables.
As growth has not been collected by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), I use growth rates calculated from
nominal GDP levels that are taken from the "Conference Board Total Economy Database” by 
simply subtracting GDP in period t from GDP in period t+1 and dividing the difference by the value
at time t. Real growth for a given year is obtained by multiplying the nominal growth rate by the 
inflation rate, which in turn has been added to 1.
2.1.1 Investigating different debt thresholds
The main result of “Growth in a Time of Debt” (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010) is simply presented by 
histograms created in Excel4. I replicated their exercise in Figure 1A by using the data set I created; 
both in nominal terms  and once more when corrected for inflation. The pattern seems not being 
altered, though the negative tendency on growth rates above a debt threshold of 90 percent of GDP 
is a bit stronger for real values. Average nominal growth for observations below 30 percent debt 
share is 1.36% higher than for those over 90 percent and 1.49% higher for real values. Interestingly,
the most prominent decline in growth rates takes place at the 30 percent level, dropping by about 
More on the nature of the data can be found following the link to Reinhart and Rogoff's main page on Debt-to-GDP 
Ratios
2 In section 2.1.2  I will further limit the analysis to 16 European countries; an argument is found there
3 http://www.rateinflation.com/inflation-rate/australia-historical-inflation-rate?start-year=1950&end-year=2012
4 Figures are found in the Appendix
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1%, which weakens the importance of the 90 percent threshold5.
When it comes to European countries6, the relationship between debt level and growth 
appears being more negative. Average nominal growth for observations below 30 percent debt share
is 1.68% higher than for those over 90 percent and 1.80% higher for real values. It reappears that 
the most prominent drop happens at the 30 percent level.
Running regressions7 of the form
reg Growth Debt if Debt > 30 & Debt <= 60 , robust 
for the European sample in Stata reported in Table 2 strengthens the critique that the relationship 
between growth and debt is much more complex than what Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) assume it to
be: the adjusted R² of 0.045 clearly suggest that a linear model, at least without any control 
variables, does not capture well the economic relationship of interest. The coefficient on debt is 
statistically significant at the 1%-level, so we cannot reject the hypothesis that debt has no negative 
impact on economic growth, though the model-specifications may be chosen poorly. The regression 
suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of debt is associated with a decline in 
economic growth by 0.2 percent.
A closer investigation of the relation between debt and growth for different ranges of debt as
specified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) partially confirms their findings and partially disproves the
existence of a 90 percent threshold: considering the effect of debt on growth, observations with debt
shares over 90 percent do have a negative impact, though the observation from looking at the 
histograms is confirmed: the decline in growth rates below the 30 percent threshold is twice that 
large – a rise of debt by 10 percent induces growth to go down by 0.5 percent. More accurate, there 
is no significant effect at levels above the value of 30. A quick look at the adjusted R²s indicates 
further that a linear model is better suited for debt shares below 30 and above 90 percent, but not in 
between.
Displaying the correlation between growth in GDP and debt share in Figure 1B points out 
that the mass of observations is situated in the range where debt-to-GDP ratio is below 100 percent, 
with a higher degree of growth rate dispersion the lower the debt share. This implies that the slope 
of the regression line outside the 0 to 100 percent window is driven by the variation of a small 
number of observations that possibly are coming from the same country or successive years.
5 Examining the distribution of countries, Canada does appear as an outlier, as all its observations are situated 
between debt levels of 100 and 450 percent of GDP, including both low and high growth rates. Clearly, the theory of
Reinhart and Rogoff is not applicable in that case, and it already can be regarded as evidence that there has to be 
some other factor that has great influence on economic performance, besides debt levels.
6 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
7 See Appendix for regression results
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2.1.2 General correlation analysis for European countries
For a more complete picture, I conducted further simple exercises on correlation. What is new is the
thought that lies behind: In order to follow Besley et al. (2010) it is important to gain insight into a 
possibly existing division of  the European countries into regional or cultural distinct areas. 
Adopting the authors' approach implies dropping Non-European countries: I am interested in 
finding a relationship between sovereign states that still are tightly connected geographically. 
Reducing the sample from 20 OECD to 16 European countries also helps getting rid of several 
issues: The distinct debt-growth pairs for Canada highly complicated clear-cut correlation analysis. 
Furthermore, the political data as presented by the University of Amsterdam is not available for the 
US. 
I consider four groups8:
Southern European countries: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain
Middle-Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands
Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Finland, Sweden
Non-EU countries: Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom
The first two groups are quite intuitive, and I don't think there is much to argue about their 
specification. Excluding Norway from the Scandinavian countries and adding the UK to the Non-
EU countries deserves an explanation. First, though Norway shares cultural and geographical 
features with Sweden or Denmark, and also is affected a lot by European laws, Norway is not 
directly underlaid the regulations of the Maastricht Treaty, while the others are. On the other hand, 
though the United Kingdom is part of the European Union, the Britain government sets national 
interests at the top of the political agenda, leading. Overall, I think that Norway, Switzerland and the
UK are distinct with respect to the other countries, and hence make up the control group within 
Europe in the sense that the Maastricht Treaty is assumed to have limited impact on these 
countries.9
2.1.2.1 Examining the distribution of debt shares across regions and time
From Figure 2 one reads that the negative relationship is most distinct for the Southern European 
countries, while the slope coefficient for the sample of Non-EU countries is close to zero. The 
former group also stands out when it comes to the intercept: the growth rate associated with zero 
debt is above 5 percentage points, while the other three regions all lie close but below that value. 
8 Not necessarily correctly specified in terms of geographical, socio-cultural, institutional affiliation
9 Nevertheless, in order to reduce wrong conclusions due to misspecification, I also consider Scandinavian and Non-
EU countries as one group in several following regressions.
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For the Scandinavian countries, no observations for debt over 80 percent do exist, which confirms 
that the group is well chosen. Another observation form Panel C and Panel D is that the data points  
for Scandinavia are smoothed over the whole range of debt while the Non-EU observations are 
clustered at low debt levels below 50 percent. This may suggest that the Scandinavian countries 
may flexibly adapt to a change in the stock of debt over time since growth rates do not show that 
large volatility relative to Southern and Middle-Western European countries. To put flesh on the 
bones, regressions of the form
reg Growth Debt if region == 1, robust
are run to report the significance of the negative impact debt has on growth separately for each 
region. Except for Non-EU countries, the coefficients in Table 3 are statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. In comparison to the overall sample, Scandinavia together with Central Europe 
correspond to the average group with a respectively 0.22 and 0.18 percent decline of economic 
activity along a 10 percent raise in debt-to-GDP ratio. The impact on the South of Europe is twice 
as large, while Non-European countries perform best, the coefficient is just -0.001. So, even if one 
divides Europe into distinct areas, there is a negative impact of debt on growth. Interestingly, the 
intercepts for the four regions are the bigger the more negative the coefficient estimate is, i.e. 
economic activity associated with zero debt would be 5.7 percent for Southern countries, 2.5 
percent above the mean growth rate and 2.9 percent higher than for the Non-EU sample. Whether 
this can be interpreted as heterogeneity in potential growth is difficult to tell as the scenario of no 
governmental debt seems rather utopic.
How good is the linear specification? Figure 3A and 3B are the graphically representation of
Figure 3 in Panizza and Presbitero (2013). It gives further evidence that debt share and economic 
growth in general are not linearly related to each other. Though it has to be mentioned that the 
average for the Southern European countries and Greece do show a linear relation. For all other 
countries a U-shape fit with bliss points not equal to a 90 percent debt level is more appropriate. As 
I do focus on investigating how debt and growth are influenced by a third dimension, a set of 
political variables, I go on by checking the simplest possible relation, namely a linear one. As this 
process amounts to the whole thesis, quadratic or other degrees of polynomial regression functions 
may be well investigated in the future.
The evolution of debt over time is displayed in Figure 4A. The first thing to notice is that the trend 
in the level of debt was never increasing for the Non-EU sample until the Financial Crisis, and that 
this group started out from a historically high value of above 80 percent of GDP. All other regions 
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show decreasing levels in the beginning, but start having increasing debt shares around 1980. 
Secondly, both the stock of debt and the rate of debt accumulation was low for Southern European 
countries until 1980, but then started to increase at a high pace the following 20 years to 80 percent 
of GDP in 2000, the highest level of all regions. Scandinavia’s stock of debt was quite similar in 
size in 1950 and actually fluctuated around the level of the Southern countries until 2000, when it 
started to plumb below 40 percent close to the level of Non-EU countries. This is interesting, since 
nowadays Scandinavia is put forwarded as examples, while Southern countries are depicted as 
ailing economies.
So what went wrong for the South, i.e. what can explain that these two regions drifted apart 
at that point in time? To evaluate the impact of institutional changes, I group together Middle-
Western Europe, Scandinavia and Southern Europe graphing them against the Non-EU sample. 
Behind this decision lies the assumption that the behaviour of Non-EU governments did not alter in 
response to the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the introduction of the Euro as currency (2001). If the 
assumption is somehow true, one consequently expects to see a different development around these 
dates. The time series until the Maastricht Treaty in Figure 4B shows clearly that the Non-EU 
countries debt share was above the rest of Europe´s just until 1990, where it turned down after 
having peaked in the mid 1980s, while the other European countries debt accumulation accelerated 
since 1980. In Figure 4C one recognizes that between 1990 and 2002 the paths of the two groups 
continue to diverge. The introduction of the Euro seems to have no further impact on government 
behaviour This is plausible if we take into account that government bonds already have been traded 
in prices pegged to the Euro during that period, and thus the introduction of coins and paper money 
was more symbolic for governments than for the people living in Europe.
The Middle-Western economies have a flatter development than the South or Scandinavia 
throughout the 1980s, but started off at an almost 20 percentage point higher level than the two 
other regions. Central Europe however is passed by the South in 1990, again around the data of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Important to notice is the fact that only Southern European countries actually 
cross the 90 percent debt level, and they do not do it until the mid-2000s.
To summarize, the debt shares European countries are facing since 2010 are not only larger 
in terms of level, but also larger in degree of divergence, which should be even more visible in the 
years to come. 
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2.1.2.2 Examining the distribution of growth rates across regions and time
I performed the same analysis for average growth rates. Yearly averages for the above specified four
regions considering the whole data set from 1950 to 2010 show in Figure 5A that economic 
performance is quite distinct. It is not as clear as with debt to group together several regions over a 
longer time span. This reflects that an economy is influenced through many channels other than 
fiscal policy – exchange rates and exchange rate regimes, shocks to particular sectors that play a 
different role in different regions, openness, internal political factors et al. – and hence one may 
observe an unequal economic performance despite a similar evolution of debt. What is similar is the
decreasing trend for Southern Europe (due to increasing debt) and a relative stable trend for the 
Non-EU sample. What should be mentioned is that the mean of growth rates has moved during the 
sample period10. 1950 to 1970 it is 4.84, while it is 2.72 between 1970 and 2008 and since the 
Financial Crisis it is yet difficult to state if or when Western economies will stabilize at the previous
level. Moreover, for the time span between 1970 and 2008 one may conclude that growth fluctuates 
around the average growth rate corresponding to having a debt-to-GDP ratio of around 90 percent. 
This contradicts what has been described in Section 2.1.2, namely that average debt shares always 
have been lower than 80 percent until the outbreak of the Financial Crisis. This may be an 
indication for that something else than debt levels do have an impact on historical changes of 
natural growth rates. Further, since the early 1990s the regions moved closely together which 
suggests both convergence and integration between European countries11. As with debt, the South 
performed extremely well until the end of the 1980s, but witnessed a fall by about 6 percentage 
points to a growth rate below zero in the early 1990s from which it never recovered fully if 
compared to the Central and Scandinavian countries.
Turning to the Maastricht treaty's and the Euro's impact, Figure 5B and 5C indicate that 
Non-EU countries are not influenced differently, i.e. there growth path is similar to the rest of the 
sample of Europe. A simple graphical check however is not enough to conclude that there was no 
impact at all. 
10 Calculations not shown
11 One reason might be the adoption of the Taylor rule by central banks
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3 Political variables
For our approach of using political variables as explanatory variables to state anything about the 
relationship between debt and growth that does not suffer from endogenous correlation the first task
is to check if we can identify any possible candidates. Thus, this section is devoted to check how the
set of political variables is related directly to debt and growth. Having analysed the kind and 
strength of the relationship makes it easier to come up with a plausible story in the final regressions 
of Section 6.
3.1 Impact of political conservatism
First, the data set is further merged with data that captures political dispersion across countries and 
over time. The political index together with the type of government capturing the degree of power 
in parliament, the years of elections, the reason of why each government was replaced, the share of 
seats in the parliament won by the strongest governmental party are all considered as explanatory 
variables. 
The Ideological Complexion of Government and Parliament (CPG) is an indicator, which introduces a 
more qualitative aspect to government composition. It attempts to account for the relative strength of 
parties in government with reference to the Left-Right dimension […]. It is operationalised as follows: 
1 = Right-wing dominance (share of seats in Government and supporting parties in Parliament larger than
66.6 per cent) 
2 = Right-Centre complexion (share of seats of Right and Centre parties in Government and supporting 
parties between 33.3 and 66.6 per cent each) 
3 = Balanced situation (share of Centre larger than 50 per cent in Government and in Parliament; or if 
Left and Right form a government together not dominated by one side or the other) 
4 = Left-Centre complexion (share of seats of Left and Centre parties in Government and supporting 
parties between 33.3 and 66.6 per cent each) 
5 = Left-wing dominance (share of seats in Government and supporting parties in Parliament larger than 
66.6 per cent); 
This information has been made available by the University of Amsterdam in the “Party 
Government Data Set” and has been adjusted personally by myself to fit the annual set-up as 
follows. In years where elections took place, or any of the political indicators is altered, I used 
Excel to calculate averages according to the number of days that each government in that given year
has been in charge. How well this approach actually does describe the conservatism of governments
is open for discussion12. Furthermore, years in which no election took place are specified by having 
a zero entry in the frequency variable. What regards Portugal and Spain, that have been 
dictatorships until the middle of the 1970s, I chose to leave out these observations for the political 
index as missing values. However, setting type of government, first party seats and total seats all 
equal to one, which indicates absolute power of a consisting of one parliamentary seat, seems 
12 To get an idea of the effort put into the tedious calculations, and potential flaws, an example is included in the 
Appendix.
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plausible and appropriate enough13. As the data on political measures only ranges until 2007, I did 
some research on elections that came up afterwards, and included the results so as to extend also the
political part of the data to 201014.
3.1.1 Investigating strategic debt hypothesis
To remember, Persson and Svensson (1989) suggest that more conservative governments will  
accumulate more debt upon a certain replacement. Evidence for their view is supported if a smaller 
value of CPG, which corresponds to a more conservative government, is related with  debt 
accumulation, while a large value implies more liberalism, and hence a reduction in debt shares.
Only if the responses are equally strong, the effects cancel out,  and the overall impact is zero, as 
the actual realized debt share will lie in between the parties wished levels, leading on average to a 
smooth debt path over time. This however is unlikely to be true. On the other hand, Alesina and 
Tabellini (1990) prescribe that it is heterogeneity of voter preference that leads to higher 
accumulation of debt. To make sure that  the successor government cannot fulfil the cravings of 
their voters, the government in power excessively uses money today on the public good it prefers 
itself. For this explanation to be true the value of the political index should not matter for the 
evolution of debt, since debt always is used strategically.
Figure 6 gives an overview of how ideology of governments in the four groups of Europe 
behaved in the past. Southern Europe witnessed an trend to more liberalism after 1970, which is 
mainly due to the fact that both Portugal and Spain had been run by a dictator until the mid-1970s, 
and is together with the Non-EU countries the region with most liberal governments prior to the 
Financial Crisis. Middle-Western countries have been quite liberal in 1990, but quickly closed up 
during the following decade, with the CPG dropping to an average of 2.5 during the 2000s. The 
Non-EU region has been the most conservative during the 1980s, and also shows a relative high 
degree of volatility in political views of governments. Scandinavia was twice as liberal as the 
Southern European countries in 1950, being at the top of the CPG distribution until 1990, but 
decreased to an overall minimum close to a value of 2 since 2005. The recent movements since 
2000, especially in Scandinavia, may well have to do with people's preferences for national interests
in respond to the entrance of Eastern European countries. This picture alone gives evidence that 
Persson and Svensson's theory (1989) does not apply in reality, since the rate at which debt is 
accumulated clearly has an increasing trend over time. One can read from column 1 to column 6 in 
13 This approach may be contested as introducing even more measurement error due to the subjective nature of the 
choice. It should be noticed, that putting 1s instead of missing values does not alter the qualitative results.
14 Links to the websites are included in the References under Data Sources
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regression Table 4A15 that a switch from a right-centre to a left-centre complexion (a 2 point 
increase in CPG_01, from here on either is called a right-to-left switch or a 2-point decrease in 
conservatism) is associated with a decrease in debt-to-GDP ratios by between 8.5 and 11 percent, 
except for Southern European countries that experience a 17.2 percentage point increase in debt. 
The average impact is estimated to be a 5.8 percent decline in debt levels, which is in line with 
Persson and Svensson (1989). Across time, which refers to column 7 to column 10, a 2-point 
decrease in conservatism is associated with a 9.8 percent decline in debt before the Maastricht 
Treaty and a 12.7 percentage reduction after the introduction of the Euro, while the decade in 
between witnessed a positive growth in debt that amounts to 14.6 percent on average. The latter 
observation may stem from special interest politics: many countries were preparing to become a 
strong member state in the Euro-zone, and hence any government (and its voters) was willing to run
deficits. Regarding the whole time span since 1992 yields a slightly positive accumulation of debt, 
though not statistically significant. Overall, the magnitude of the effects seems unreasonably high; 
empirically, observed variations in debt in the aftermath of a government replacement are rather 
small, suggesting that OLS estimation is sub-optimal.
From these findings one may not conclude whether debt is used strategically or not, or 
which explanation of the theory of strategic use of debt is more likely to hold in reality. One may 
suspect that a mixture of both is true; for instance, Figure 6 suggests that the period between 
Maastricht and Euro introduction was relatively liberal taking all region together, while column 9 
states that debt was growing, going clearly against Persson and Svensson (1989). Hence, together 
with the fact that there has been witnessed an increase in debt shares on average, the degree of voter
preference heterogeneity still appears being the explanation behind strategic use of debt. To get a 
final confirmation, one has to take a closer look on public spending. To be in line with Alesina and 
Tabellini (1990), one expects to find that governments of  varying CPG have distinct spending 
patterns across public goods. This is checked in Section 4.
3.1.2 Examining correlation between conservatism and economic growth
It is more difficult to form a clear intuition on what strategic use of debt implies for economic 
performance. In line with Persson and Svensson (1989) a more conservative government uses more 
money than it finds optimal, but no assumptions are made on the issue of efficiency. The same holds
for Alesina and Tabellini's (1990) approach. Just using more money on a particular good will 
probably lead to missallocation of resources and hence underprovision of essential public services.
15 Regressions of the form reg Debt CPG_01, robust
CPG_01 excludes Portugal and Spain before 1974, resulting from the discussion above
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From Table 4B one recognizes that the impact on growth is not significantly different from zero for 
the whole sample. For Scandinavian and Non-EU countries it is significant at the 1 percent level but
with opposing signs; while for Southern Europe economic activity is decreasing by 1.6 percent 
upon a righ-to-left switch, economic activity is stimulated in Scandinavia by 1.8 percent. During he 
time before the Maastricht Treaty liberalism is associated with a drop in growth rates by 0.56 
percent, while the years afterwards do not show any significant relation. Neither does the 
introduction of the Euro play a role as reflected by Column 10. Still, taking the results from Table 
4A and 4B together, one recognizes that for periods in which debt rises growth is negative and  it is 
positive when the stock of debt is reduced. This may be interpreted by a Keynesian point of view 
that larger public spending does not stimulate the economy in the long run. So for all regions there 
is support for that the CPG affects debt and growth with opposite signs, and hence is conform with 
the idea that parties' ideological preferences drives economic real variables. 
3.2 Impact of political competition
To test whether political competition drives variation in debt accumulation across countries or over 
time, this section reproduces and describes the same regressions and graphs as Section 3.1 but with 
the measure for competition, Comp, as explanatory variable. This variable is computed in the 
following way, similar to that in Besley et al. (2010, p.1338) but adjusted to the fact that there are 
more than two competing parties: Comp = |Seats_share – (1/Parties)|, where 
Seats_share corresponds to the number of seats that the strongest party in government wins at a 
given election and Parties to the number of parties running for office. A value of zero indicates 
perfect competition, while a value of 1 implies no competition at all.
3.2.1 Examining relationship between debt share and political competition
Besley et al.'s (2010) findings that more competition is associated with low-tax policies does not 
mean that finding a positive correlation between competition and debt is qualitatively the same. 
However, the data on European countries confirm that more debt is accumulated in a competitive 
surrounding. This finding reassures the thought of debt being used strategically when reappointment
of a government is unsure, which is true in a competitive environment. Note also that looking at 
debt and growth as being solely driven by competition among parties, their ideology should not 
matter; i.e. CPG has no explanatory power in that story, since policy platforms will converge in 
equilibrium.
Summarizing the constructed competition barometer yields a similar picture as for US states.
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The mean value is equal to 0.228, implying that the degree of political competition in Europe is 
vivid. Averages by region are all in the range between 0.10 and 0.40, with two pairs of regions 
clearly grouping together. The Non-EU and Scandinavia countries lie most of the time below the 
other two regions, closer to a situation of perfect competition. The Southern countries witnessed a 
rapid decline in competition throughout the 1960s and until 1975, well anchored in Spain's, 
Portugal's and Greece's history. The past decades, the region steadily recovered, but still lies above 
the other groups. In line with the shift to conservatism observed above, Scandinavia became less 
competitive during the 1990s. 
Regression Table 5A indicates that lower competition is associated with a growing debt-to-
GDP ratio. The overall effect of a 0.1 increase in the measure (which reflects a movement away 
from perfect competition) suggests that debt climbs by 2.3 percent. Put the other way around, more 
competition decreases the stock of debt. This result however is strongly driven by the Non-EU 
sample, for which the estimated effect is 7.4 percentage points, and the time before the Maastricht 
Treaty. This tells us that political competition has different implications between regions in Europe, 
probably related to historical or cultural features. Nevertheless, from the already suggested negative
relation between debt and growth one expects economic activity to increase when competition is 
tighter. Such developments are in line with a simple probabilistic voting model and competitive 
market theory: policy converges towards the social optimum, having a low stock of debt in a 
growth-enhancing environment; The estimated values for perfect competition, i.e. the intercepts, are
yet quite heterogeneous for the four regions. Middle-Western Europe is assumed to experience the 
highest debt share of 53.5 percent of GDP, while Scandinavia and Non-EU countries would show a 
stock of barely 24.4 percent. How realistic those differences are is yet again questioned, especially 
since Scandinavia is known for supporting a large public.
Over time the only significant effect is prior to 1992, for which the same decrease in 
competition as above is associated with 3.1 percent larger values of debt. Though, the intercept 
changes from a low of 28.6 to a high of 68.2 percent between Maastricht and Euro introduction, for 
to decline to around 45.3 during the first decade of the 21st century. This may reflect a change of 
demand after a larger public sector over time.
3.2.2 Correlation between economic activity and political environment
As for the political index,  column 1 of Table 5B states that competition has no significant effect on 
economic activity. This result is not in line with Besley et al.'s (2010) main finding that suggests a 
growth enhancing effect. This may be due to several reasons, of which one is related to the nature of
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the data. Cross-country observations are probably much less comparable than within state-level 
observations within a single country. Hence, assuming that measurement error or other issues are 
blurring the regression coefficients, including more variables on the right hand side can shed light 
on whether political competition can explain economic development. This is done in Section 5. 
What regards the the coefficients that are significant, the proper signs do not apply; one would like 
to see negative coefficients, which in reverse implies a positive effect when moving towards zero – 
all estimates however are positive. Personally I do not believe that these predictions should be taken
as carved in stone, but rather reflect that the model is badly specified, as indicated by low values of 
the adjusted R².16 The alternative is that political competition is mostly associated with uncertainty 
about who is in power the next period. This may lead to incentive problems as the incumbent party 
may not internalize future social marginal benefits of public funded investments. Politicians seem to
be reluctant to finance welfare programs or investments that have no instant visible effects on 
citizens. Future benefits may be reaped by a follower-government and could be used tactically to 
persuade uninformed voters in electoral campaigns later on. Myopic behaviour of governments then
creates barriers to growth-enhancing spending decisions, as suggested by Azzimonti (2011).
4 Relation between growth, debt and expenditure variables
In the previous section on investigating the strategic debt hypothesis17, I mentioned that ideological 
distinct parties may put different weights on different types of public goods. In my opinion, this is 
quite a realistic assumption. If public expenditure by preferences varies in the degree of how 
persistent growth is stimulated, then the degree of conservatism alone would play an important role 
in explaining movements in growth. Let us assume that public expenditure may be either productive
(R&D) or not, and that liberal parties have a preference for investing in research and development. 
Hence, a higher share of public spending on R&D, all else equal, has a positive effect on growth in 
the long run. If one further assumes that progressive parties prefer higher taxes in order to finance 
investments, and that debt is used strategically, the following statement is true:
Periods with highly conservative governments are associated with accumulating debt, lower 
taxes and lower growth, while periods led by liberals also would show growing debt but 
increasing tax shares and non-declining growth, independent of the degree of competition. 
The rest of the section tries to find empirical evidence for the intuition on how public finance 
16 It should be mentioned that changes in the estimates while proceeding along the thesis occur, but I hope that all 
observations are explained plausible on economical grounds.
17 Section 2.2.1.1
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develops in the light of political economics. First, some thoughts on marginal effects are presented 
in 4.1. The following section picks up the statement made above, testing if political preferences, 
competition or a combination of both fits the data.
4.1 Evolution of debt, taxes and social spending
Battaglini and Barseghyan (2012) put forward a political economy model of endogenous growth. In 
their model the evolution of growth „is characterized by [...] the shrinking government effect: public
debt grows faster than GDP, provision of public goods and infrastructure grows slower than GDP, 
and the tax rate declines“ (Battaglini and Barseghyan, 2012, p.2 f.) As a quick check, Figure 818
confirms a similar development for European countries. Not in line with the notion of a shrinking 
government is the share of R&D which is growing over the whole observation period19. Another 
thing to mention is that decreasing paths of R&D and total public expenditure are evident until the 
year 2000, but quickly rising during the following decade. Today, this may of course be seen in light
of the Financial crisis, which was preceded by a period of building up unsustainable expenditure 
levels curbed by easy credit, and hence may be regarded as a prolonged deterioration of historical 
movements20. The fact however, that the data on Europe first starts in 1996 may have substantial 
impact on my findings on a shrinking public sector, since it suggests an upward trend.
In order to check whether there exists a shrinking government effect for Europe in general, I 
regress public finance variables on debt, i.e. for instance reg taxrevenue Debt, robust, 
displayed in Table 6A. Debt has a significant effect on all variables, with a 10 percent increase 
leading to 1.6 percent more spending on total expenditures, a roughly 1 percentage point increase in
the share of tax revenues, but 0.1 percent less spending on R&D. So, the first thing to conclude is 
that a growing debt stock crowds out productive investment. A plausible intuition behind the strong 
link between debt and total expenditure – the correlation coefficient is 0.6 – may be that debt to a 
large degree is taken up to finance public good provision. That tax revenue is moving in the same 
direction as debt and public expenditure can be motivated by a simple Keynesian model: public 
consumption stimulates growth which widens the tax base, leading to higher tax revenues 
automatically, at least in the short run. Investigating the data does however not suggest that higher 
18 Corresponds to Figure 1: Fiscal trends in the U.S. economy on page 2 of Barseghyan and Battaglini (2012)
19 There may be several reasons for that: 1) the data on R&D for European countries includes private spending, which 
may develop in a distinct matter:; 2) Europe invests a larger share of GDP on R&D than the US; 3) the development 
for the US is not that different – by looking at Figure 1 (Barseghyan and Battaglini, 2012), one notices that the 
downward trend for the US mainly is driven by the period before 2000, since then the development is flat, or even 
slightly rising
20 Barseghyan and Battaglini's (2012) own estimated path after 2010 leads investments and total expenditures quickly 
back to trend
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spending stimulates growth; the only plausible explanation then is that the data mirrors long-run 
implications, namely that debt cannot be rolled over for a long time, suggesting that some form for 
budgetary discipline is present in reality. Moreover, if public spending is short-sighted, i.e. the 
investment in R&D is low, growth in the long-run is supposed to decline, amplified by the 
requirement of balanced budgets. The fact that growth and R&D are negatively related can be 
explained by a simple growth model with technology growth21: National production will fall 
immediately after a switch to more research activity, but eventually will pick up; regarding the 
small time horizon and the distortive impact of the Financial Crisis on overall growth, it seems 
possible that the gains from R&D are not yet seen22. Overall, the story seems to fit the correlation 
analysis.23 Regressing Debt on the lagged values of expenditure, rd and taxrevenue in Table 6B 
suggests that the existence of reverse causality is substantial. The level of debt is cut by 10 percent 
for each 1 percentage point increase in the share of R&D; debt rises more than 1-to-1 with an 
increase of last periods tax income, which at first seems odd. However, if one assumes that taxes 
had to rise to match the accumulation of debt last period, then this relationship is obvious. 
Even though one has to be cautious what regards the direction of impacts, I conclude that the
data on European countries confirms that not only the existence of debt matters to growth, but also 
whether debt is used on productive activities or not. Hence, the notion of strategic debt hypothesis 
by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) is reinforced.
4.2 Are conservatives more likely to comply with a shrinking government?
From column 1 Table 7C one reads that tax revenues rise with the political index, suggesting that 
more liberal governments indeed have a preference for higher taxes. Can we then conclude further 
that a positive correlation between taxes and spending on R&D is due to preferences, i.e. is there 
evidence that less conservative parties embrace growth oriented spending?
To answer this question, one has to check the relationship between growth, the political 
index and R&D shares displayed in Table 7A. At first sight, the political index has no significant 
power in explaining movements in growth. The same is true for the share of R&D, though it almost 
has a significant negative impact on growth. Although some comment regarding the sign of the 
effect R&D may have on growth has been made, the overall conclusion that conservatism does not 
matter for growth is disappointing and contra-intuitive. Given the fact that possibly many different 
channels influence growth, it is more likely to be the case that, on average, opposing forces cancel 
21 Weil  (2009)
22 Indeed, in Figure 10 Panel E growth picks up for R&D shares larger than 3 percent
23 Not shown
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each other out. To check whether this is the fact, I use economic relationships to go along a line of 
intuitive statements to show that conservatism not only matters, but actually explains what is 
observed in the data.
Independently of preferences, if for a given share of R&D total governmental expenditure 
increases, spending on R&D as a share of public spending (R&D_share) decreases which is 
confirmed by column 1 in Table 7B. Having tax revenues moving in the same direction as 
expenditures as evident in Figure 9A, i.e. increasing, while R&D is positively correlated with tax 
revenues as shown in Table 7B column 3 and 4, then R&D_share will be increasing as well. More 
precisely, a 10 percentage point increase in expenditures crowds out 0.02 percent of investment in 
research and development, while an equal tax increase goes in hand with 0.01 percent higher 
investments. So, with two effects of different sign, but almost equal size, the overall effect of R&D 
on growth should be close to zero and/or not significant, which confirms the observation made 
above. Moreover, the fact that R&D as share of expenditures is not influenced by debt, as Column 2
indicates, it is likely that debt is not used to implement growth-enhancing policies, points into the 
same direction. 
To state anything about the role of preferences, one has to take a closer look at how public 
finance variables interact with the political index. Even though the coefficients on  expenditure and 
R&D are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level24, Table 7C confirms that higher values of
the political index are associated with higher tax revenues, less debt accumulation and overall 
expenditures, but more spending on R&D, and hence one may conclude that more liberal 
governments have a preference for growth-enhancing policies, while the opposite must be true for 
conservatives.  A shift from a centre-right to a centre-left government leads to 2.7 percent higher tax
revenues and 5.8 percent lower levels of debt. Moreover, since the sample is balanced25 what 
regards the political index, the opposing effects on growth, coming directly from the degree of 
conservatism and indirectly through the share of R&D, most likely do cancel out on average. 
Given that, I would like to say one more thing regarding the sign of the coefficient on 
R&D_share: as mentioned above, the share increases when either expenditures decrease or tax 
revenues increase; but since liberals have a preference for R&D, it is more likely the case that taxes 
go up, which by itself reduces growth26 until technology improvements break through. Additionally,
even though not significant, the coefficient on CPG is positive when both effects are included in 
column 3 of Table 7A, which points in the direction that more liberal governments indeed undertake
spending decisions that enhance future growth. So, coming back to the question in the section's title,
24 Which may be due to the small number of observations
25 From the codebook 3 refers to a balanced government; the mean of CPG_01 is 3.08, fairly balanced
26 Refers to Figure 9B
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the answer in my opinion is yes, conservative governments behave more in line with the shrinking 
government effect than liberals do. 
4.3 What is the role of competition?
If however political competition is the reason for how public finances do behave over time, as put 
forward by Besley et al. (2010), more competition will lead to lower taxes, higher spending on 
R&D and hence to positive effects on growth, no matter what preferences parties do have. In line 
with that view, public expenditure as total also has to be taken as a growth-enhancing factor. 
Table 8 makes clear that more lax competition is associated with higher debt and 
expenditure levels, but less spending on R&D. The fact that spending on R&D increases with 
competition reinforces the idea by Besley et al. (2010) that diminishing monopolistic power creates 
an environment for investments to thrive. The coefficient on taxes is negative, but not significant. 
So, the data does confirm Besley et al.'s (2010) findings in so far total expenditure is assumed being
unproductive.
As a next step it then seems natural to check implications for growth.  In the long regression 
from Column 6 in Table 8, reg Growth Debt expenditure rd taxrevenue CPG_01 
Comp,robust, the coefficients on total expenditure and R&D are negative, which implies that less 
competition induces both productive and unproductive spending to slow down by 0.01 and 0.08 
percent respectively. Interestingly, the coefficients on debt, taxes and both political variables on 
growth are all not significantly different from zero. As before27, this may indicate that any direct 
effect that those variables may have on growth do disappear when the regression specification is 
widened up. Most likely this is due to the endogeneity problem that gets amplified when including 
more and more variables that do influence and get influenced by the regressand. Indeed, it is not 
difficult to find an explanation for why growth seems being unaffected by debt or taxes. 
If the relations between debt and growth and taxes and growth are non-linear, which is 
confirmed by Figure 10 Panel A and B, then on average the opposite effects that debt and taxes have
on growth may cancel out. To show why this may be true, let us first define BB = (Debt/taxrevenue)
as a measure of whether the budget is balanced or not: a value of 1 means that the current deficit is 
zero, and the budget is balanced, while a value larger than 1 implies that tax revenues do not cover 
the issuance of new debt, and hence the deficit is positive; for values smaller than 1 the government 
earns more tax revenues than necessary, and thus builds up a surplus. To get a better picture, I will 
use a flow-diagram to describe the effects when fiscal policy is expansionary in terms of taxes. 
27 Referring to the findings regarding R&D share and growth
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Assuming that public finances are running a surplus initially, for instance, the tax share is 50 and 
the debt share 25 percent, so BB is equal to 0.5, lower taxes will increase growth. Further I assume 
that the budget has to be balanced in every period, and in order for this to hold debt is accumulated, 
so the public fiscal surplus gets reduced. In my analysis on debt intervals in Section 2.1.1, I found 
that more debt is more harmful at the lower end than for values above 90 percentage, which 
suggests that even though expansionary fiscal policy stimulates growth in the short run28, this is not 
true for debt issuance29. So, initially following movements are plausible in my opinion:
− When debt increases, growth decreases
− Tax revenues decrease, which stimulates growth
− For initial low levels of debt, the positive effect of lower taxes dominates
− The budgetary deficit increases, though tax revenues are still higher than expenditures
Keeping up expansionary policy eventually will lead to a situation in which the effect of lower taxes
on growth is as big as the negative effect that debt has on the economy, then there is essentially no 
change in the growth rate apparent, though the deficit increases further. This should be the case 
when the budget is balanced, yet the stock of debt is increasing. At this point debt shares overgrow 
revenue shares, and due to the requirement of a balanced budget the pace at which debt further 
increases is accelerating, leading to the following scenario:
− When debt increases, the downturn will be more severe
− Tax reductions have a limited effect on growth
− Overall, economic activity will decline
− The budget ratio is now larger than one, i.e. expenditures exceed tax revenues
Even if growth is starting to decline at a lower rate for debt shares of above 100 percent of GDP, 
this effect should not counteract the downward-pushing effects that high current deficits, interest 
payments and probably the labour market situation have on economic activity. 
Put all together, this leads to an inverse U-shaped relationship between fiscal balance and growth. 
For high tax revenues, relative to the stock of debt, growth is increasing, while it is decreasing for 
high public deficits. The change in the growth rate is zero where the opposing marginal effects of 
lower taxes and higher debt are equal in size. The intuition is confirmed by the data in Figure 10 
Panel C. The peak of the deficit to growth relation , where no real change in growth is observed, is 
28 The intuition is confirmed by Figure 10 Panel D, which shows that growth increases with low expenditure-to-GDP 
ratios, but declines for shares larger than 30 percent
29 One explanation may be that the obligation to take up debt to balance the current budget constraint in a situation in 
which the government simply could use up the stock of former surpluses, may be regarded as inefficient. Debt 
always comes with a cost, though it may be small for low levels: paying interest, loss of market confidence, 
sanctions in the case of the Euro-zone and so on, which all may have a depressing impact on growth at low levels of 
debt.
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at the value of 1 where the budget is balanced. A current surplus stimulates growth, while a current 
deficit represses activity. The quadratic relationship between debt and growth is depicted in Figure 
10 Panel A, and reproduces a similar curve as that for the Middle-Western countries only in Figure 
3A., which shows that debt alone may harm growth more at low levels than at high levels. The fact 
that increasing taxes always depress growth, i.e. all countries are on the left side of the Laffer-curve,
has implications for the degree that impulses from debt to growth differ for different values of debt 
shares, leading to the shape described above. The stimulating effect a tax reduction has on the 
economy are the stronger the lower the tax rate. Though, the lower the share of debt the higher the 
passthrough of lower taxes on growth, and vice versa if the debt-to-GDP ratio is high.
The overall conclusion of this section is that the reduced form effect of competition on 
public expenditure is as suggested by Besley et al.(2010). However, the result that more competition
leads to less spending on R&D which is a growth-enhancing activity goes against his findings, and 
is more in line with the strategic debt hypothesis, namely that short-sightedness and preferences 
lead to inefficient resource allocation.
5 Including more explanatory variables
Sections 3 and 4 only focus on the direct effect that the political index or political competition have 
on debt and growth. This narrow specification most likely suffers strongly from omitted variable 
bias, however. This part tries to shed light on interactions of these main political variables with 
other factors that may play an indispensable role in determining governmental power, and thus the 
development of government spending. First, in 5.1, I quickly present the variables and how they 
affect debt and competition. Next, by looking at correlation coefficients, I investigate in 5.2 if the 
intuition was correct, and the connection they have with the political index.
5.1 Overview of political variables
The following variables are taken from the same database as the CPG data, and are calculated the 
same way30. Together with a short presentation some intuition on what one would expect to see in 
light of the strategical debt hypothesis and competition as a limitation to debt accumulation is 
included.
− The reason for termination (RfT) ranges from 1 to 7, with low values being associated with 
30 Complete description of those variables is found in the  “Codebook Party Government Data Set“ belonging to “The 
Party Government Data Set“
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voluntary termination, while higher values above or equal to 5 with loss of confidence or 
forced resignation: the higher the value of RfT the more abrupt the change of government. If
this is anticipated  this will, together with rising uncertainty surrounding the survival of the 
government, cause debt to increase.
− The type of government (ToG) is on a scale from 1 to 6, which stands for single party 
government and caretaker government respectively. Resting on the results of the strategic 
debt hypothesis, the more concentrated the power, the closer to 1, the less debt is used 
strategically, as the probability of replacement is reduced. The same conclusion holds when 
using the degree of competition as an argument: more competition stimulates growth.
− The yearly change of government (Freq); The strategic debt hypothesis suggests that 
uncertainty about who will be in power the next period induces governments to spend 
money excessively today. This however rests on the assumption that the date of the 
upcoming  election is known, which did not hold for the 1950s and 60s. Thus, that a higher 
frequency of unforeseen governmental shifts within a year is expressed by lower debt 
accumulation may also be true, since extremely short periods of governing means that only 
few, if any,  political decisions are made by each government before being replaced again. 
Yet, competition should be high in those periods.
− A measure for government support (Gov_share), constructed as the number of parties in 
power divided by total number of parties; That governmental support is negatively 
correlated with competition in a multi party environment seems reasonable: The more 
parties in power the less parties to compete with exist. How debt is affected is less clear: 
frictions within a multi party coalition that faces a weak opposition (low overall 
competition) may lead to higher spending, as every party in government claims its share. 
Facing a tough opposition, such that the coalition has to align their different preferences, 
may on the other hand dampen debt accumulation. Yet again, many parties in power imply 
that the probability for small coalition partners to fall out the next election is high, thus they 
try to move spending towards their purposes.
For RfT and ToG the effect on debt used strategically and on competition are assumed to go in the 
same direction, which in turn would have opposing effects on growth; the exercise on expenditures 
and taxes in the preceding section put forward the idea  that public expenditures are not efficient 
when debt is used strategically, and hence economic activity is low, while Besley et al. (2010) argue
that the reduced form effect of competition is to stimulate growth. What regards Freq and 
Gov_share, as explained above, there are two opposing explanations for how the strategic use of 
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debt is influenced, and hence no conclusion is made for those factors.
5.2 Has the intuition been right?
Regressing debt on these variables makes it possible to evaluate the significance of the effects. 
Looking at Table 9, the coefficients on ToG, Freq and Gov_share are all negative and significant, 
implying that more instability and having to share power moderates the growth in debt, 
contradicting the strategic debt hypothesis.  Quantitative,  a 2-point increase in ToG, which for 
example amounts to a shift from a coalition that barely has more than 50 percent of the votes to a 
government without majority ruled by a single party, and having one more election in a given year 
leads to a 5 percentage decline in the level of debt. Quite similar in size, namely 4.5 percent, is the 
impact of having 10 percent of all existing parties included additionally in the governing coalition, 
i.e. Gov_share rises by 0.1. Together all three variables indicate that a more unstable and uncertain 
political situation causes debt to decrease, which can be interpreted in the light of  Besley et al. 
(2010) having more competition. 
To be able to include those variables as additional regressors, one has to check the 
connection with the political index and competition. Column 2 shows that the significance of the 
degree of conservatism is not affected by electoral uncertainty, captured by the type of government 
and the frequency of elections, which fits to the story of a more competitive environment. 
Unfortunately, the direction of how competition by itself affects debt switched and is statistically 
significant; a 0.1 change towards more concentrated power now decreases debt by 3.7 percent. The 
effect on growth in Column 4 is as before and, in comparison to Column 5 and 6 of Table 8, became
significant at the 1 percent level: the same change of 0.1 towards less competition strangles growth 
by about 0.5 percent. This finding together with the results on ToG, Freq and Gov_share supports 
the reasoning that more competition reflects a more unstable environment in terms of which party 
will be in power the next period, which further strengthens the idea of using debt strategically, and 
what also explains the sign shift in the regression treating debt as the dependent variable.
Including all variables in the regression on growth in column 4 of Table 9 yields that only 
debt and competition do have an impact: both decrease economic activity. So, including more 
political variables to specify the political environment rather destroys than strengthens the results 
found by Besley et al. (2010). Growth is not enhanced by competition, and neither does the stock of




How is it possible that a highly significant positive effect of competition on debt can be turned into 
a significant negative effect? It is time to think more sophisticated about the relation between 
economic variables, between economic and political variables and across countries and time. The 
intuition behind abandoning OLS, even though clear to readers that belong to the field of 
economics, is the following: Independently of the issue of endogeneity and reverse causality, macro 
panel data is especially prone to two types of heterogeneity: the same country is followed over 
several periods as well as different countries are observed at the same point in time, which means 
that data points are clustered at the country level. This also implies that the error terms are serially 
correlated within a country. Further the variance of the error terms may not be constant, so there is 
heteroskedasticity31. Multicollinearity, besides autocorrelation, will be an issue when lagged 
variables are included, but may also exist independently of lagged variables. The problem of 
omitted variables can never be neglected. Most importantly, the main assumption for using OLS, 
namely that the error terms are uncorrelated with the regressors, might not hold in reality, leading to
inconsistent estimates. Aggregates like macro data have so far not been able to detect all relevant 
factors to make sure that the condition holds, so the problem of including endogenous variables on 
the right hand side of the regression is apparent. What one would like to do when randomized 
experiments are not possible is to find other ways to ensure that the correlation between explanatory
variables and the residual are close to zero. Unfortunately, I cannot identify any of the political 
variables to be taken as an instrumental variable to get rid of the endogenous correlation between 
debt and growth32. What then is left is to specify the model as robust as possible including panel 
data implements and political control variables to deal with heterogeneity issues.
The next section gives an overview of tests that help identifying an appropriate model 
specification, while Section 6.2 uses that specification to review once more the relation between 
conservatism, competition and public sector variables, as well as the impact on debt and growth of 
all political variables. The last part of the paper wraps up how and how well the data fits to 
theoretical assessments.
6.1 Tests for a better specification
As a starting point, I checked whether a random effects model performs better than OLS estimation 
by performing the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test. The conclusion is that OLS should
be abandoned. 
31 This has already been dealt with so far using the robust command
32 ToG, Freq, Gov_share and the interaction of ToG and Freq have been tested
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As a next step, I evaluated a fixed against a random effects model. This is done with help of 
the Hausman test, which sets the random effects model as being the correct one. “It basically tests 
whether the unique errors (ui) are correlated with the regressors, the null hypothesis is they are not“ 
(Princeton University). The probability of obtaining the chi-square statistic is essentially 1, which 
means that the difference in coefficients is not systematic and the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. This suggests using a random effects model.
To test whether time fixed effects should be included, I follow the suggestion by Torres-
Reyna (Princeton University) and run “a joint test to see if the dummies for all years are equal to 0”.
One can indeed reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients on the year dummies are zero, which 
means that time fixed effects do matter and shall be included. Anyway, out of own interest, I include
an additionally dummy that specifies whether a country signed the Maastricht Treaty or not; this 
will make it easier to rule out that results are driven by the fact whether countries did or did not sign
it. Another problem with macro data may be contemporaneous correlation. The “Pasaran CD (cross-
sectional dependence) test is used to test whether the residuals are correlated across entities. The 
null hypothesis is that residuals are not correlated” (Princeton University). The result is that the data
set indeed suffers from cross-sectional dependence. Moreover, I suspect that the error terms are 
serially correlated with each other, as well as clustered by country, to take out those effects I 
construct region and country dummies, and use cluster robust error specifications.
Having identified that my macro panel-data most likely suffers from heteroskedastic error 
terms which also are correlated across countries and time, I chose to run regressions of the 
following syntax: reg dep_var vector_expl_var yy* i.region ctrydum2-ctrydum16, 
cluster(Country)33; when turning to the debt and growth regressions displayed in Table 11, also 
Maastricht dummies in interaction with CPG_01 and Comp are included.
6.2 Robustness of linear correlations
Table 10A once more investigates the impact of the political index. Including fixed effects makes all
coefficients being insignificant, which basically means that conservatism is no explanatory force 
when heterogeneity between countries is removed. Table 10B looks at competition, which neither 
has explanatory power in explaining variations in public finance variables and growth alone.
The last examination checks whether the coefficients get significant when more political 
variables, as well as the lags of public expenditure variables are included in the long regressions of 
debt and growth. If this is observed, it seems obvious that the findings in Table 10A and 10B are 
33 Before adopting that syntax I checked that using the xtreg command together with the option re, i.e. specifying 
expicitly the model to be a random effects one did not alter the results
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due to omitted variable bias that drives the estimates towards zero.
Indeed, the effects on growth in Column 3 and 4 of Table 11A have yet again become 
significant: more liberal governments and higher degree of competition both improve growth, while
the negative coefficient on CPG_comp indicates that more left-oriented coalitions are less 
responsive to a shift towards a more competitive surrounding. None of the other political variables 
are significant by themselves. What regards debt, the most important factors are debt as share of 
GDP and the growth rate from the preceding period. Additionally, the type of government and the 
share of parties in government are significant at  the 5 and 2 percent significance level respectively. 
However their signs are opposite, which means that there is no clear support for the idea that more 
parties in power are associated with less debt accumulation.
Though the specifications used in Column 1 to 4 get rid of fixed effects and omitted variable
bias what regards the political dimension, including lagged values of growth and debt probably 
severs the endogeneity problem. A neater way to capture growth is to look at how GDP per capita 
evolves over time. This idea leans on Besley et al. (2010) who exactly used the lag as measure in 
their growth regression. The possibilities of specifying a regression have become quite large now, 
so in Table 11 Column 5 to 7 the preferred ones are shown. The choice is based on the correlation 
analysis from Table 11B. Comparing the lagged, current and  forwarded value of GDP per capita 
reveals that the lagged value is the most correlated with growth and the least with debt. What 
regards expenditure, the lag of GDP per capita is strongest correlated with the lag of expenditure, 
though the coefficient is almost half of that for debt (-0.262 and -0.486 respectively). As the 
correlation between the lag of GDP per capita and current expenditure is even lower, it seems a 
good idea to use this variable instead of debt in the growth regression. The fact that expenditure has 
a pretty similar relationship to growth and the lagged value of GDP per capita can be interpreted as 
having identified a good proxy for last period growth, and which may imply some sort of a constant
growth in the share of expenditures due to demographic changes. Moreover, the fact that past and 
current values of expenditure are almost perfectly correlated suggests that expenditure has to be 
regarded as being determined out of the need to provide public services, which changes over time, 
but not drastically between two periods. Similar conclusions can be drawn when deciding whether 
to use the lagged  or the current value of expenditure as explanatory variable – the former seems to 
be more prone to endogeneity. Another reason why not to use the lagged value of expenditure is due
to the finding that the correlation with growth is positive, and hence may simply capture the short-
term effect of expansionary fiscal policy34.
34 As mentioned above, all the possibilities have been tested by running regressions; also the lagged value of R&D has 
been tested, but discarded due to too little precision; also changes in the R² from specification to specification have 
been taken into consideration
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But why to include any form of a spending variable when this strategy is prone to 
endogeneity issues? It can be justified in the following way: If one assumes that debt is issued in 
order to finance some non-trivial share of all governmental spending, then it seems rather odd to not
incorporate a measure for how strong this incentive is, here in terms of size. Further, the decision to 
take up debt then is determined within each period, while of course past choices are affecting the 
outcome today, and therefore the lag of expenditure is not added. The contingency on prior 
decisions is captured by the lag of GDP per capita instead, which from Figure 11 seems to have 
been growing at a constant rate since 1950, and hence can be considered as not being driven by 
debt, but rather being one of the  explanatory factors for why debt has been growing since then.
Interestingly, for all regressions, both debt and growth, the coefficient on the lag of GDP per capita 
is precisely estimated close to zero; this finding confirms that this measure of citizens' welfare is not
driving macroeconomic performance when country and time fixed effects are controlled for, and 
hence is a good proxy for economic prosperity. This results also reinforces the idea of political 
variables as being determinants of those macroeconomic variables the government can control 
(debt) or influence (growth through governmental investment and consumption). GDP per capita 
instead is the aggregate of individual production weighted by the population, a much less volatile 
measure of economic activity.
For growth, excluding expenditure can be motivated by concerns regarding the  multiplier 
effect public spending has on growth, though the adjusted R² drops below 0.5. Another oddity is 
that the constant term is as high as 20 in the regression that includes expenditure, which seems quite
unrealistically. The degree of conservatism as well as political competition play a role in explaining 
growth. An anticipated change from a left-centred to a right-centred government is associated with a
rise in growth rates by 1.2 percentage points. This is in line with theoretical predictions that more 
liberal parties do engage more in growth-enhancing activities than conservative governments. 
Competition however has a negative impact on growth, a 0.1 percent movement towards zero leads 
to a 0.9 decline in growth. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative as well, which implies 
that a change to a more liberal government or a reduction of overall competition are substitutes, or 
as interpreted above, more liberal governments are less responsive to competition, and can be 
labelled as being more strong in terms of ideology. This means that rightist parties adapt more to 
changes in voters preferences, or that they basically move towards the centre position when faced 
with electoral uncertainty. So, if conservative parties behave more in line with the predictions of a 
probabilistic voting model, i.e. convergence on a weighted social optimum when the parties' 
optimization problems are symmetric, competition would yield a lower stock of debt and thus 
higher growth. That competition actually dampens growth then has to do with how the more liberal 
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governments respond to uncertainty. If they are policy motivated rather than office-seeking, more 
uncertainty does not change their preferences for pro-growth policies. However, they could be more
inclined to use debt strategically in order to either boost the probability of re-election, or to guide a 
more conservative successor towards more public spending by leaving a lower stock of inherited 
debt. The former explanation seems to be the case when looking at Column 5 of Table 11. 
Debt is increasing with the political index, though the size of the coefficient is not credible. 
A change from a left-centre to a right-centre complexion is associated with an increase of about 29 
percent. Hence, from this result  one should not draw the conclusion that the strategic debt 
hypothesis is not valid. One explanation rests on how incentives of re-election may be incorporated 
in the debt hypothesis (Persson and Tabellini, 2002, Ch.13 p.360): “The empirical implication is 
that governments are more likely to issue debt if their natural constituency is small and has a strong 
ideological attachment. In this case it is better to appeal to the more mobile swing voters in the 
opposition party's constituency”. So, though the size of the effect plausibly seems to be estimated 
too high, the direction may well be in line with the theory. Against that thought speaks the type of 
the data – a panel; for such a theory to hold in reality, conservative parties would have to have a 
larger electorate base in most of the countries, and more precisely, at any point in time. This seems a
too ambitious assumption to be true in reality. More conform with the argumentation made along 
the thesis35 is to recognize that collinearity between conservative preferences and their main policy 
instrument, expenditure, is causing the significant switch in sign and size. In the sense that the 
coefficient on CPG_01 expresses the fact that more conservative governments prefer higher public 
spending that is not related to growth-enhancing investments, clearly debt is increasing more 
whenever such a government is in place. Through the strong identification of conservative parties 
with higher expenditure and debt levels clearly one effect incorporates the other, leading to a 
strange estimate for the other. Here this preference effect is caught by the coefficient on expenditure
while the coefficient on the political index is fed into the error term.
If expenditure is included only the type of government and the share of parties in 
government are influencing growth. If for instance the type changes from a single party to a 
coalition that just reached absolute power, growth is predicted to pick up by 1.04 percent. Growth is
also increasing with the number of parties in power. This could be interpreted as a sole within-
coalition mechanism of checks and balances. Also, even if competition as an overall measure has 
explanatory power, the sign of the coefficient has switched, which is more in line with the story of 
Besley et al. (2010). Expenditure itself reduces growth by 0,22 percent per 1 percentage point 
increase, while for debt the same change induces the stock of debt to increase by more than 1 
35 The coefficient on CPG_01, if significant, has broadly been negative around a value of 5 throughout the paper
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percent. To wrap up the analysis, one should mention that, beside the coefficient on CPG_01 in 
Column 5 and the constant term in Column 6, the predicted effects and interceptions are all at 
decent meaningful values. Average growth, absent of all fiscal and political frictions and 
heterogeneity between countries, would be 2.188 and the natural level of debt would be 80 percent 
of GDP. To draw the connection back to the starting point of the analysis, a 90 percent level should 
then not pose any threat to the solvency of countries, and hence, Reinhart and Rogoff's (2010) claim
is yet again weakened by more thoroughly consideration of mechanisms behind the evolution of 
growth and debt.
Conclusion
It proves extremely difficult to take a stand on causality or even to conclude which model or which 
theory do best fit a panel data of 16 distinct European countries. The final regression results do 
show that a linear relationship between debt, growth and political factors may work fine in making 
predictions on movements in those variables. Concerns regarding non-symmetric behaviour of 
voters, economic agents  and politicians still have to be taken seriously. As space and time are 
limited, this investigation has to be left to later work or other authors. Nevertheless, the overall 
conclusion of the mostly descriptive analysis has to be that there are strong political forces in play 
when governments do decide upon fiscal policy. Strategic considerations feed into decisions on 
investment, tax rates and debt issuance. Having disentangled the channels through which different 
political variables influence macroeconomic determinants, should help to  a better understanding of 
why similar countries have shown so distinct developments. Even though the analysis does not 
include any hardcore econometric strategy, it is a starting point for future attempts to dig deeper into
the material on which dimensions politics do determine growth an debt, or the other way around – 
reverse causation always has to be taken into consideration. 
Probably some more data on public investment should be gathered and also other forms for 
the index of political polarization and competition should be constructed. Incorporating for instance 
election results in order to determine how close or far a party has been  from winning the election 
creates a forcing variable, which then can be used in a regression discontinuity design around a 50 
percent vote share. This has been done by Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) and Folke (2014) for a single 
country, Swedish municipalities and Norway respectively. The largest obstacle to succeed in 
following such attempt clearly is limited access to required data. So, focusing on a single country 
might be the most naturally way to go, at least in the beginning. Yet another dimension is the 
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difference between electoral systems. Maybe it is more appropriate to compare countries within 
each system. The most interestingly extension, in my opinion, is to include measures of labour 
market organization. Unemployment always has been, and now is the macroeconomic indicator that
individuals most care about. Clearly, the design of the size and duration of unemployment benefits 
should interact with growth and debt. But, voting decisions are based as well on labour market 
prospects and what parties promise to do about it. Hence, parties can tailor their policy platforms to 
please the electorate. These are just a few thoughts on how more or other data can be added. 
Another way of proceeding may be to pick a political model or a theory and try to check with more 
sophisticated econometric procedures whether or not it does fit to panel data.
Evidently, the idea that growth solely is determined by debt has to be strongly repealed by 
the findings along the thesis, which proves to be good news for a future recovery in the Euro zone.
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Data Sources
Main Databases
Reinhart and Rogoff database [visited  18.04.2013]: Debt-to-GDP Ratios
Available online at http://www.reinhartandrogoff.com/data/browse-by-topic/topics/9/ 
  
Total Economy Database [visited 05.07.2013]: Output, Labor, and Labor Productivity, 1950 – 2012
Available online at http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/  
  
The World Bank DataBank [visited 02.04.2014]: World Development Indicators
Expense (% of GDP)
Available online at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS/countries/AT-BE-
DK-FI-FR?page=4&display=default
Tax revenue (% of GDP)
Available online at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS/countries/AT-BE-
DK-FI-FR?display=default
Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)
Available online at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS/countries?
display=default
  
Worldwide Inflation Data [visited 11.07.2013]:
inflation by country - quick links
Available online at http://www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/austria/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-
austria.aspx
  
Party Government Data Set [visited 03.10.2013]:  Woldendorp, J., H. Keman and I. Budge. 2011. Party 
Government in 40 Democracies 1945-2008. Composition-Duration-Personnel. University of 
Amsterdam, Faculty of Social Science.




Information on election results after 2007
European election database [visited 2013]:










Historical information on Greece and Portugal
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metapolitefsi
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carnation_Revolution
Example of calculating the political variables
The section http://www.fsw.vu.nl/en/Images/Austria%20protec_tcm31-255226.xls, taken from the 
PGDS, represents the first eight governments in Austria after World War II, where RfT is reason for 
termination, ToG type of government and Py1Seats the number of seats won by the strongest party 
in power. The main exercise was to generate a yearly-based sequence of those variables. Let's 
consider 1954 to 1956:
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In 1954 and 1955 no election took place, so I copied the values for 1953. In 1956 however two 
different governments were in power during the course of the year, so I computed averages 
according to the days each government had been in power; for Py1Seats the calculation is [(174*82)
+ (191*74)]/365 = 77,81 which leads to an Excel-sheet similar to the one below.
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1950 Austria 0,00 2,00 77,00
1951 Austria 0,00 2,00 77,00
1952 Austria 0,00 2,00 77,00
1953 Austria 1,00 2,00 80,74
1954 Austria 0,00 2,00 82,00
1955 Austria 1,00 2,00 82,00
1956 Austria 0,00 2,00 77,81
1957 Austria 0,00 2,00 74,00
1958 Austria 0,00 2,00 74,00
1959 Austria 4,00 2,00 76,37
1960 Austria 3,00 2,00 79,00
1961 Austria 1,00 2,00 79,00
1962 Austria 0,00 2,00 79,00
1963 Austria 2,00 2,00 80,55
Appendices
Figures
Figure 1A: Average Growth Rates by Debt Levels
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OECD Countries
Debt Growth obs Debt real_Growth obs
<30 4,07 494 <30 4,13 434
<60 3,11 358 <60 3,14 333
<90 2,86 179 <90 2,76 145
>90 2,71 169 >90 2,64 158
European Countries
Debt Growth obs Debt real_Growth obs
<30 3,91 432 <30 3,94 375
<60 2,96 291 <60 2,96 266
<90 2,82 143 <90 2,71 114
>90 2,23 94 >90 2,14 85
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Figure 1B: Correlation of Debt and Nominal Growth
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Figure 2: Correlation between Debt and Growth by Regions
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Figure 2: Correlation between Debt and Growth by Regions
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Figure 3B: Quadratic relationship between Debt and Growth by Countries
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Figure 4A: Average Debt share of GDP by regions
Figure 4B: Average Debt shares before Maastricht Treaty
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Figure 5A: Average Growth rate by Regions
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Figure 5C: Average Growth after Maastricht Treaty
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Figure 7: Average Political Competition by Regions
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Figure 8: Evolution of Public Finance variables
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Panel C: Average Tax revenue as share of GDP
Figure 8: Evolution of Public Finance variables
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Figure 9A: Correlation between Expenditure and Tax revenue
Figure 9B: Correlation between Growth and Tax revenues
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Figure 10: Quadratic relation between Growth and Public finance variables
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Figure 10: Quadratic relation between Growth and Public finance variables
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Growth Debt Tax Expen- R&D Political Political Reason for Type of Frequency Governm.
Revenue diture Index Competition Termination Governm. Share
Southern 3.878 44.304 28.272 38.490 0.962 2.893 0.258 1.037 2.062 0.557 0.390
[3.244] [34.041] [7.396] [6.451] [0.292] [0.877] [0.172] [1.684] [1.436] [0.871] [0.355]
N 240 244 184 60 53 193 244 244 244 244 244
Middle- 3.362 48.954 37.959 39.736 1.997 3.043 0.256 1.104 2.419 0.505 0.309
Western [2.685] [29.539] [4.926] [6.339] [0.424] [0.840] [0.097] [1.734] [0.890] [0.653] [0.166]
N 360 365 276 90 90 366 366 366 366 366 366
Scandinavia 2.873 33.199 43.396 36.503 3.114 3.396 0.178 1.157 3.716 0.579 0.287
[2.707] [21.514] [5.784] [3.227] [0.602] [0.812] [0.081] [1.699] [0.959] [0.706] [0.124]
N 180 183 138 45 40 183 183 183 183 183 183
Non-EU 2.806 36.793 33.390 31.623 1.833 3.058 0.182 0.525 2.370 0.596 0.539
[2.253] [32.699] [7.028] [8.545] [0.352] [0.782] [0.092] [0.953] [1.257] [0.525] [0.329]
N 180 183 138 39 31 183 183 183 183 183 183
Total 3.295 42.563 35.700 37.443 1.926 3.085 0.228 0.989 2.564 0.549 0.368
[2.783] [30.658] [8.123] [6.922] [0.824] [0.847] [0.123] [1.610] [1.267] [0.703] [0.270]
N 960 973 736 234 214 925 976 976 976 976 976
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Table 2: Investigating different Debt Thresholds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth
  Overall   if Debt<30 if Debt<30 & >60 if Debt<60 & >90  if Debt>90 
Debt -0.020 -0.053 -0.020 0.029 -0.025
[0.003]*** [0.019]*** [0.017] [0.025] [0.020]
_cons 4.134 4.832 3.832 0.690 4.957
[0.159]*** [0.376]*** [0.787]*** [1.798] [2.152]*
Adjusted R2 0.0452 0.0138 0.0006 0.0027 0.0151
N 958 432 291 143 92
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01; Reported for nominal growth rates only
Table 3: Distribution of Debt Shares across Regions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Growth Growth Growth Growth
  Southern  Middle-Western  Scandinavian    Non-EU   
Debt -0.041 -0.018 -0.022 -0.001
[0.005]*** [0.004]*** [0.008]*** [0.005]
_cons 5.711 4.244 3.601 2.841
[0.338]*** [0.268]*** [0.365]*** [0.267]***
Adjusted R2 0.1847 0.0368 0.0254 -0.0055
N 240 360 180 178
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01
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Table 4A: Investigating Strategic Debt Hypothesis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt
Overall  Southern Middle-
Western
Scandinavian   Non-EU  Non-EU &
Scan
 Year<=1991  Year>=1991 Year>1991
& <=2001
 Year>2001
CPG_01 -2.920 8.667 -4.249 -4.050 -6.706 -5.556 -4.984 0.745 7.340 -6.354
[1.229]** [2.876]*** [1.806]** [1.887]* [3.499] [1.994]*** [1.402]*** [1.968] [2.870]** [2.661]**
_cons 52.754 25.332 61.897 46.951 57.304 52.921 52.383 54.605 35.123 73.325
[4.021]*** [8.891]*** [5.682]*** [6.453]*** [11.637]*** [6.943]*** [4.731]*** [6.386]*** [9.577]*** [8.563]***
Adjusted
R2
0.0053 0.0406 0.0119 0.0180 0.0206 0.0242 0.0191 -0.0027 0.0294 0.0285
N 922 193 365 183 181 364 618 320 160 144
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01; column (6) sample of Non-EU and Scandinavian countries; column (7) before Maastricht Treaty; 
column (8) after Maastricht Treaty; column (9) between Maastricht and Euro currency; column (10) after introduction of the Euro
63
Table 4B: Conservatism and Economic Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth
 Overall  Southern Middle-
Western
Scandinavian   Non-EU  Non-EU &
Scan
 Year<=1991  Year>=1991 Year>1991
& <=2001
Year>2001
CPG_01 -0.143 -0.803 -0.262 0.905 0.047 0.479 -0.281 0.218 0.136 -0.052
[0.104] [0.238]*** [0.147] [0.258]*** [0.206] [0.161]*** [0.120]* [0.161] [0.208] [0.265]
_cons 3.585 5.621 4.160 -0.199 2.663 1.296 4.496 1.437 2.354 1.589
[0.349]*** [0.782]*** [0.469]*** [0.959] [0.665]*** [0.563]* [0.398]*** [0.554]*** [0.780]*** [0.827]
Adjusted
R2
0.0010 0.0497 0.0041 0.0688 -0.0054 0.0220 0.0069 0.0018 -0.0043 -0.0068
N 911 191 360 180 180 360 607 320 160 144
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01; column (6) sample of Non-EU and Scandinavian countries; column (7) before Maastricht Treaty; 
 column (8) after Maastricht Treaty; column (9) between Maastricht and Euro currency; column (10) after introduction of the Euro
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Table 5A: Relation between Debt Share and Political Competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt
Overall  Southern Middle-
Western
Scandinavian   Non-EU  Non-EU &
Scan




Comp 22.727 3.041 -17.865 39.031 73.513 59.049 31.315 10.359 -40.017 44.243
[7.119]*** [10.803] [15.002] [21.736] [14.539]*** [12.305]*** [6.866]*** [17.780] [29.426] [22.940]
_cons 37.374 43.519 53.533 26.257 23.391 24.353 28.569 54.675 68.206 45.344
[1.895]*** [3.768]*** [4.246]*** [4.119]*** [2.802]*** [2.341]*** [1.820]*** [4.431]*** [7.397]*** [5.716]***
Adjusted
R2
0.0073 -0.0039 0.0007 0.0161 0.0382 0.0317 0.0191 -0.0020 0.0063 0.0214
N 973 244 365 183 181 364 669 320 160 144
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01; column (6) sample of Non-EU and Scandinavian countries; column (7) before Maastricht Treaty; 
column (8) after Maastricht Treaty; column (9) between Maastricht and Euro currency; column (10) after introduction of the Euro
65
Table 5B: Competition and Economic Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth




  Non-EU  Non-EU &
Scan
 Year<=1991  Year>=1991 Year>1991
& <=2001
Year>2001
Comp 1.401 -1.502 2.688 3.084 3.341 3.220 0.645 2.757 5.162 0.632
[0.937] [1.587] [1.350]* [2.108] [1.428]* [1.218]*** [1.028] [1.599] [2.320]* [2.121]
_cons 2.975 4.268 2.671 2.325 2.202 2.262 3.671 1.518 1.676 1.303
[0.234]*** [0.458]*** [0.361]*** [0.448]*** [0.327]*** [0.269]*** [0.265]*** [0.361]*** [0.482]*** [0.509]**
Adjusted
R2
0.0028 0.0021 0.0066 0.0030 0.0130 0.0098 -0.0005 0.0074 0.0284 -0.0064
N 960 240 360 180 180 360 656 320 160 144
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01; column (6) sample of Non-EU and Scandinavian countries; column (7) before Maastricht Treaty; 
column (8) after Maastricht Treaty; column (9) between Maastricht and Euro currency; column (10) after introduction of the Euro
Table 6A: Relation between Debt and Public Finances
(1) (2) (3)
Expenditure   R&D  Taxrevenue
Debt 0.163 -0.009 0.098
[0.011]*** [0.002]*** [0.009]***
_cons 28.089 2.461 31.408
[0.820]*** [0.128]*** [0.528]***
Adjusted R2 0.4365 0.0888 0.1258
N 234 214 734
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01
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_cons -1.508 75.888 -50.658
[3.453] [5.045]*** [7.775]***
Adjusted R2 0.1248 0.0982 0.4803
N 718 200 219
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01
Table 7A: Preferences as Determinant of Growth
(1) (2) (3)





_cons 3.585 2.938 2.412
[0.349]*** [0.379]*** [0.688]***
Adjusted R2 0.0010 0.0127 0.0111
N 911 215 215
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01
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Table 7B: Influence of Public Finances on R&D as Share of Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)







_cons 0.124 0.078 -1.193 -0.002
[0.015]*** [0.005]*** [0.320]*** [0.016]
Adjusted R2 0.1678 0.1855 0.3429 0.0925
N 215 215 214 215
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01; column (3) has R&D as Share of GDP as dependent variable
Table 7C: Preferences by Conservatism I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Taxrevenue  Debt Expenditure   R&D  
CPG_01 1.339 -2.920 -0.703 0.016
[0.321]*** [1.229]** [0.418] [0.071]
_cons 32.099 52.754 39.613 1.877
[1.091]*** [4.021]*** [1.389]*** [0.228]***
Adjusted R2 0.0214 0.0053 0.0027 -0.0045
N 715 922 234 214
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01
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Table 8: Impact of Competition I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Taxrevenue  Debt Expenditure   R&D   Growth  Growth 
Comp -6.474 22.727 14.515 -3.007 1.401 0.050











_cons 37.166 37.374 34.246 2.612 2.975 6.186
[0.917]*** [1.895]*** [1.555]*** [0.132]*** [0.234]*** [1.586]***
Adjusted R2 0.0069 0.0073 0.0368 0.1091 0.0028 0.0571
N 736 973 234 214 960 212
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01
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Table 9: Including other political variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Debt  Debt Growth Growth
RfT 0.634 0.659 0.025 -0.035
[0.836] [0.831] [0.081] [0.075]
ToG -2.167 -2.497 -0.006 0.128
[0.761]*** [0.815]*** [0.080] [0.080]
Freq -4.732 -5.181 0.086 0.276
[1.717]*** [1.775]*** [0.208] [0.191]
Gov_share -36.923 -44.619 1.184 -0.140







_cons 63.626 90.978 2.805 2.883
[2.793]*** [6.195]*** [0.256]*** [0.676]***
Adjusted R2 0.1142 0.1182 0.0093 0.0787
N 973 922 960 909
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01
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Table 10A: Preferences by Conservatism II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Taxrevenue  Debt Expenditure   R&D   Growth
CPG_01 0.133 0.825 -0.104 0.014 -0.104
[0.205] [1.496] [0.603] [0.039] [0.168]
_cons 30.797 45.955 33.718 1.292 2.421
[0.795]*** [5.241]*** [2.076]*** [0.135]*** [0.668]***
Adjusted R2 0.8836 0.5285 0.8146 0.9506 0.4618
N 715 922 234 214 911
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01; Coefficients for Year, Country and Region dummies not shown
Table 10B: Impact of Competition II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Taxrevenue  Debt Expenditure   R&D   Growth 
Comp 2.603 -27.326 0.845 -0.462 0.223
[3.140] [20.286] [6.334] [0.455] [1.705]
_cons 28.961 56.166 33.205 1.459 2.707
[0.966]*** [8.347]*** [2.808]*** [0.168]*** [0.853]***
Adjusted R2 0.8927 0.5511 0.8145 0.9513 0.4589
N 736 973 234 214 960
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01; Coefficients for Year, Country and Region dummies not shown
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Table 11A: Regressions with Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 Debt  Debt  Growth  Growth  Debt  Growth  Growth
L.Debt 0.964 0.964 0.095 0.093
[0.012]*** [0.011]*** [0.042]* [0.041]*
L.Growth -0.409 -0.385 0.269 0.260
[0.131]*** [0.118]*** [0.078]*** [0.074]***
CPG_01 -0.292 -0.152 0.447 0.416 14.513 0.173 0.591
[0.399] [0.414] [0.167]** [0.189]* [3.878]*** [0.543] [0.240]*
Comp -7.219 -4.926 6.944 6.516 22.802 -6.267 9.765
[4.200] [4.313] [1.964]*** [2.018]*** [46.164] [7.359] [2.830]***
CPG_comp 1.831 1.430 -2.163 -1.985 -26.095 1.226 -2.723
[1.382] [1.488] [0.614]*** [0.723]** [11.764]* [2.371] [0.968]**
RfT 0.107 -0.045 0.437 0.051 -0.071
[0.086] [0.051] [0.351] [0.063] [0.053]
ToG -0.448 0.145 -0.802 0.528 0.304
[0.230] [0.062]* [2.196] [0.148]*** [0.150]
Freq 0.192 0.135 -0.529 -0.028 0.150
[0.310] [0.107] [0.766] [0.189] [0.128]
Gov_share 2.380 0.261 10.522 2.496 0.305
[0.970]* [0.523] [7.668] [1.028]* [0.862]
Debt -0.102
[0.041]*




_cons 5.538 4.712 2.752 2.449 81.149 20.953 2.188
[2.353]* [2.080]* [1.113]* [1.029]* [24.160]*** [4.461]*** [1.680]
Adjusted R2 0.9881 0.9883 0.5503 0.5515 0.9451 0.8129 0.4890
N 894 894 894 894 234 234 911
* p<0.05; ** p<0.02; *** p<0.01; Coefficients for Year, Country, Region and Maastricht dummies not shown
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Table 11B: Correlation of Endogenous Variables related to Growth
L. F. L. F.
GDP/capita GDP/capita GDP/capita Growth Debt Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure
GDP/capita
L.1 1.0000
. . . 0.9897 1.0000
F.1 0.9712    0.9892 1.0000
Growth -0.2693    -0.1343 -0.0784 1.0000
Debt -0.4860     -0.5050 -0.5112 -0.0782 1.0000
Expenditure
L.1  -0.2618      -0.2637 -0.2588 0.0021 0.6890 1.0000
. . .  -0.1946       -0.2249 -0.2345 -0.1919 0.6712 0.9527 1.0000
F.1 -0.1131 -0.1570 -0.1937 -0.2827 0.6003 0.8680 0.9450 1.0000
L. refers to lagged values, F. refers to forwarded values
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Statistical Tests
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
        Growth[Num,t] = Xb + u[Num] + e[Num,t]
        Estimated results:
 Var    sd = sqrt(Var)
Growth          7.180264 2.679601
e    5.264478       2.294445
u    .2091678       .4573486
Test:   Var(u) = 0
chibar2(01) =    18.92
                             Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
Hausman test fixed against random effects
 Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(9) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
                           =        0.69
                      Prob>chi2 =      0.9999
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
Testing time fixed effects after running random-effects GLS regression
  
  testparm i.Year
  
 ( 1)  1952.Year = 0




 (58)  2009.Year = 0
 (59)  2010.Year = 0
chi2( 59) =  516.21
                Prob > chi2 =    0.0000
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence 
=    24.589, Pr = 0.0000
   
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements
  
=     0.317
Do-file
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1   // The data set and the do-file are uploaded in my Dropbox, and are available on request
2   // NB! the command run quietly will give error notifications that some variables do not 
exist
3   // this has to do with collapsing the observations on mean values when creating most of 
the figures;
4   // it works if those parts are replicated by using Execute (do) //
5   
6   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
7   
8   *********
9   * Means *
10   *********
11   * All countries
12   sum Growth Debt expenditure taxrevenue rd CPG_01 Comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share
13   *Regions separately
14   sort region
15   by region: sum Growth Debt expenditure taxrevenue rd CPG_01 Comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share
16   
17   *************************************************
18   * 2.1.1 Investigating different debt thresholds *
19   *************************************************
20   *Figure 1A: Means by Debt Ranges as Reinhart and Rogoff
21   *Figure 1B ///
22   graph twoway (lfit Growth Debt) (scatter Growth Debt)
23   reg Growth Debt, robust
24   outreg, ctitle("","(1)"\"","Growth"\"","  Overall  ")note(Reported for nominal growth
rates only)/*
25   */se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4)replace
26   reg Growth Debt if Debt <= 30, robust
27   outreg, ctitle("","(2)"\"","Growth"\""," if Debt<30 ")/*
28   */se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
29   reg Growth Debt if Debt >30 & Debt <= 60, robust
30   outreg, ctitle("","(3)"\"","Growth"\"","if Debt<30 & >60")/*
31   */se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
32   reg Growth Debt if Debt > 60 & Debt <= 90, robust
33   outreg, ctitle("","(4)"\"","Growth"\"","if Debt<60 & >90")/*
34   */se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
35   reg Growth Debt if Debt > 90, robust
36   outreg using data_Europe1, title(Table 2: Investigating different Debt Thresholds)
ctitle("","(5)"\"","Growth"\""," if Debt>90 ")/*
37   */se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
38   
39   ****************************************************************************
40   * 2.1.2.1 Examining the distribution of debt shares across regions and time*
41   ****************************************************************************
42   *gen so = 0 
43   *gen ne = 0
44   *gen mw = 0
45   *gen sc = 0
46   *"so is Southern, ne Non-EU, mw Middle-Western, sc Scandinavia"
47   *replace so = 1 if Num == 9
48   *replace so = 1 if Num == 11
49   *replace so = 1 if Num == 15
50   *replace so = 1 if Num == 16
51   *replace mw = 1 if Num == 2 
52   *replace mw = 1 if Num == 3
53   *replace mw = 1 if Num == 7
54   *replace mw = 1 if Num == 8
55   *replace mw = 1 if Num == 10
56   *replace mw = 1 if Num == 13
57   *replace sc = 1 if Num == 5
58   *replace sc = 1 if Num == 6
59   *replace sc = 1 if Num == 17
60   *replace ne = 1 if Num == 14
61   *replace ne = 1 if Num == 18
62   *replace ne = 1 if Num == 19
63   *gen region=0
64   *replace region=1 if so==1
65   *replace region=2 if mw==1
66   *replace region=3 if sc==1
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67   *replace region=4 if ne==1
68   
69   *Figure 2 panel A to D///
70   graph twoway (lfit Growth Debt) (scatter Growth Debt) if region == 1
71   graph twoway (lfit Growth Debt) (scatter Growth Debt) if region == 2
72   graph twoway (lfit Growth Debt) (scatter Growth Debt) if region == 3
73   graph twoway (lfit Growth Debt) (scatter Growth Debt) if region == 4
74   
75   reg Growth Debt if region== 1, robust
76   outreg, ctitle("","(1)"\"","Growth"\"","  Southern  ")/*
77   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) replace
78   reg Growth Debt if region == 2, robust
79   outreg, ctitle("","(2)"\"","Growth"\"","Middle-Western")/*
80   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
81   reg Growth Debt if region == 3, robust
82   outreg, ctitle("","(3)"\"","Growth"\""," Scandinavian")/*
83   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
84   reg Growth Debt if region == 4, robust
85   outreg using data_Europe1, addtable pretext(""\"") title(Table 3: Distribution of Debt
Shares across Regions)ctitle("","(4)"\"","Growth"\"","   Non-EU   ")/*
86   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
87   
88   
89   * How good is the linear specification? *
90   *Figure 3: Quadratic fit ///
91   graph twoway (qfit Growth Debt if region==1)(qfit Growth Debt if region==2) (qfit
Growth Debt if region==3) (qfit Growth Debt if region==4)
92   graph twoway (qfit Growth Debt if Num==2)(qfit Growth Debt if Num==3) (qfit Growth
Debt if Num==5) (qfit Growth Debt if Num==6)/*
93   */(qfit Growth Debt if Num==7)(qfit Growth Debt if Num==8)(qfit Growth Debt if Num==9
)(qfit Growth Debt if Num==10)/*
94   */(qfit Growth Debt if Num==11)(qfit Growth Debt if Num==13)(qfit Growth Debt if Num==
14)(qfit Growth Debt if Num==15)/*
95   */(qfit Growth Debt if Num==16)(qfit Growth Debt if Num==17)(qfit Growth Debt if Num==
18)(qfit Growth Debt if Num==19)
96   *graph twoway (qfit Growth Debt if Num==9)
97   
98   
99   * Examining the distribution of debt shares across time *
100   *Figure 4A ///
101   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
102   gen year=.
103   local k=1950
104   local i=1951
105   local j=1
106   while `i' <= 2010 {
107   replace year=`j' if (Year<=`i'&Year>=`k')
108   local i = `i' + 1
109   local k = `k' + 1
110   local j = `j' + 1
111   }
112   sort Country year Year
113   egen dec=min(Year), by(Country year)
114   collapse (mean) Debt, by(region dec)
115   reshape wide Debt, i (dec) j(region)
116   rename Debt1 so
117   rename Debt2 mw
118   rename Debt3 sc
119   rename Debt4 ne
120   label variable dec ""
121   label variable so "Southern"
122   label variable ne "Non-EU"
123   label variable mw "Middle-Western"
124   label variable sc "Scandinavia"
125   # delimit ;
126   scatter so mw sc ne dec, title("Figure 4A: Average Debt share of GDP by regions", margin(
medsmall) size(large))
127   ytitle("Debt share", margin(small) size(medsmall))
128   xtitle("Year", margin(small) size(medsmall))
129   xlabel(1950 "1950" 1960 "1960" 1970 "1970"
130   1980 "1980" 1990 "1990" 2000 "2000" 2010 "2010")
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131   msymbol(none none none none) msize(medium medium medium medium) mcolor(dark_blue green
maroon dark_orange)
132   connect(l l l l);
133   
134   *Figure 4B: until Maastricht (so,sc,mw vs. ne) ///
135   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
136   gen year=.
137   local k=1950
138   local i=1951
139   local j=1
140   while `i' <= 1992 {
141   replace year=`j' if (Year<=`i'&Year>=`k')
142   local i = `i' + 1
143   local k = `k' + 1
144   local j = `j' + 1
145   }
146   sort Country year Year
147   egen dec=min(Year), by(Country year)
148   collapse (mean) Debt, by(region dec)
149   reshape wide Debt, i (dec) j(region)
150   rename Debt1 so_mw_sc
151   rename Debt2 ne
152   label variable dec ""
153   label variable so_mw_sc "Southern, Middle-Western, Scandinavia"
154   label variable ne "Non-EU"
155   # delimit ;
156   scatter so_mw_sc ne dec, title("Figure 4B: Average Debt shares before Maastricht Treaty",
margin(medsmall) size(large))
157   ytitle("Debt share", margin(small) size(medsmall))
158   xtitle("Year", margin(small) size(medsmall))
159   xlabel(1950 "1950" 1960 "1960" 1970 "1970" 1980 "1980" 1990 "1990")
160   msymbol(none none none none) msize(medium medium medium medium) mcolor(dark_blue
dark_orange)
161   connect(l l l l);
162   
163   *Figure 4C: after Maastricht (so,sc,mw vs. ne) ///
164   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
165   drop if Year <= 1990
166   gen year=.
167   local k=1991
168   local i=1992
169   local j=1
170   while `i' <= 2010 {
171   replace year=`j' if (Year<=`i'&Year>=`k')
172   local i = `i' + 1
173   local k = `k' + 1
174   local j = `j' + 1
175   }
176   sort Country year Year
177   egen dec=min(Year), by(Country year)
178   collapse (mean) Debt, by(region dec)
179   reshape wide Debt, i (dec) j(region)
180   rename Debt1 so_mw_sc
181   rename Debt2 ne
182   label variable dec ""
183   label variable so_mw_sc "Southern, Middle-Western, Scandinavia"
184   label variable ne "Non-EU"
185   # delimit ;
186   scatter so_mw_sc ne dec, title("Figure 4C: Average Debt shares after Maastricht Treaty",
margin(medsmall) size(large))
187   ytitle("Debt share", margin(small) size(medsmall))
188   xtitle("Year", margin(small) size(medsmall))
189   xlabel(1990 "1990" 1995 "1995" 2000 "2000" 2010 "2010") msymbol(none none none none) msize
(medium medium medium medium) mcolor(dark_blue dark_orange)
190   connect(l l l l);
191   
192   ******************************************************************************
193   * 2.1.2.2 Examining the distribution of growth rates across regions and time *
194   ******************************************************************************
195   *Figure 5A ///
196   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
197   gen year=.
198   local k=1950
199   local i=1951
200   local j=1
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201   while `i' <= 2010 {
202   replace year=`j' if (Year<=`i'&Year>=`k')
203   local i = `i' + 1
204   local k = `k' + 1
205   local j = `j' + 1
206   }
207   sort Country year Year
208   egen dec=min(Year), by(Country year)
209   collapse (mean) Growth, by(region dec)
210   reshape wide Growth, i (dec) j(region)
211   rename Growth1 so
212   rename Growth2 mw
213   rename Growth3 sc
214   rename Growth4 ne
215   label variable dec ""
216   label variable so "Southern"
217   label variable ne "Non-EU"
218   label variable mw "Middle-Western"
219   label variable sc "Scandinavia"
220   # delimit ;
221   scatter so mw sc ne dec, title("Figure 5A: Average Growth rate by regions", margin(
medsmall) size(large))
222   ytitle("Growth rate", margin(small) size(medsmall))
223   xtitle("Year", margin(small) size(medsmall))
224   xlabel(1950 "1950" 1960 "1960" 1970 "1970"
225   1980 "1980" 1990 "1990" 2000 "2000" 2010 "2010")
226   msize(medium medium medium medium) msymbol(none none none none) mcolor(dark_blue green
maroon dark_orange)
227   connect(l l l l);
228   
229   *Figure 5B: until Maastricht (so,sc,mw vs. ne) ///
230   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
231   gen year=.
232   local k=1950
233   local i=1951
234   local j=1
235   while `i' <= 1992 {
236   replace year=`j' if (Year<=`i'&Year>=`k')
237   local i = `i' + 1
238   local k = `k' + 1
239   local j = `j' + 1
240   }
241   sort Country year Year
242   egen dec=min(Year), by(Country year)
243   collapse (mean) Growth, by(region dec)
244   reshape wide Growth, i (dec) j(region)
245   rename Growth1 so_mw_sc
246   rename Growth2 ne
247   label variable dec ""
248   label variable so_mw_sc "Southern, Middle-Western, Scandinavia"
249   label variable ne "Non-EU"
250   # delimit ;
251   scatter so_mw_sc ne dec, title("Figure 5B: Average Growth before Maastricht Treaty",
margin(medsmall) size(large))
252   ytitle("Growth", margin(small) size(medsmall))
253   xtitle("Year", margin(small) size(medsmall))
254   xlabel(1950 "1950" 1960 "1960" 1970 "1970"
255   1980 "1980" 1990 "1990")
256   msize(medium medium medium medium) msymbol(none none none none) mcolor(dark_blue
dark_orange)
257   connect(l l l l);
258   
259   *Figure 5C: after Maastricht (so,sc,mw vs. ne) ///
260   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
261   drop if Year <= 1990
262   gen year=.
263   local k=1991
264   local i=1992
265   local j=1
266   while `i' <= 2010 {
267   replace year=`j' if (Year<=`i'&Year>=`k')
268   local i = `i' + 1
269   local k = `k' + 1
270   local j = `j' + 1
271   }
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272   sort Country year Year
273   egen dec=min(Year), by(Country year)
274   collapse (mean) Growth, by(region dec)
275   reshape wide Growth, i (dec) j(region)
276   rename Growth1 so_mw_sc
277   rename Growth2 ne
278   label variable dec ""
279   label variable so_mw_sc "Southern, Middle-Western, Scandinavia"
280   label variable ne "Non-EU"
281   # delimit ;
282   scatter so_mw_sc ne dec, title("Figure 5C: Average Growth after Maastricht Treaty", margin
(medsmall) size(large))
283   ytitle("Growth", margin(small) size(medsmall))
284   xtitle("Year", margin(small) size(medsmall))
285   xlabel(1990 "1990" 1995 "1995" 2000 "2000" 2005 "2005" 2010 "2010")
286   msize(medium medium medium medium) msymbol(none none none none) mcolor(dark_blue
dark_orange)
287   connect(l l l l);
288   
289   *summary table, average growth rates _ DO NOT INCLUDE*
290   su Growth if Year <= 1970
291   su Growth if Year > 1970 & Year <= 2008
292   
293   *************************************************
294   * 3.1.1 Investigating strategic debt hypothesis *
295   *************************************************
296   *Figure 6 ///
297   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
298   gen year=.
299   local k=1950
300   local i=1951
301   local j=1
302   while `i' <= 2010 {
303   replace year=`j' if (Year<=`i'&Year>=`k')
304   local i = `i' + 1
305   local k = `k' + 1
306   local j = `j' + 1
307   }
308   sort Country year Year
309   egen dec=min(Year), by(Country year)
310   collapse (mean) CPG_01, by(region dec)
311   reshape wide CPG_01, i (dec) j(region)
312   rename CPG_011 so
313   rename CPG_012 mw
314   rename CPG_013 sc
315   rename CPG_014 ne
316   label variable dec ""
317   label variable so "Southern"
318   label variable ne "Non-EU"
319   label variable mw "Middle-Western"
320   label variable sc "Scandinavia"
321   # delimit ;
322   scatter so mw sc ne dec, title("Figure 6: Average Conservatism by regions", margin(
medsmall) size(large))
323   ytitle("CPG", margin(small) size(medsmall))
324   xtitle("Year", margin(small) size(medsmall))
325   xlabel(1950 "1950" 1960 "1960" 1970 "1970"
326   1980 "1980" 1990 "1990" 2000 "2000" 2010 "2010")
327   msize(medium medium medium medium) msymbol(none none none none) mcolor(dark_blue green
maroon dark_orange)
328   connect(l l l l);
329   
330   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
331   reg Debt CPG_01, robust
332   outreg, ctitle("","(1)"\"","Debt"\"","Overall")/*
333   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) replace
334   reg Debt CPG_01 if region==1, robust
335   outreg, ctitle("","(2)"\"","Debt"\""," Southern ")/*
336   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
337   reg Debt CPG_01 if region==2, robust
338   outreg, ctitle("","(3)"\"","Debt"\"","Middle-Western")/*
339   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
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340   reg Debt CPG_01 if region==3, robust
341   outreg, ctitle("","(4)"\"","Debt"\"","Scandinavian")/*
342   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
343   reg Debt CPG_01 if region==4, robust
344   outreg, ctitle("","(5)"\"","Debt"\"","  Non-EU  ")/*
345   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
346   reg Debt CPG_01 if region>=3, robust
347   outreg, ctitle("","(6)"\"","Debt"\"","Non-EU & Scan")/*
348   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
349   reg Debt CPG_01 if Year<=1991, robust
350   outreg, ctitle("","(7)"\"","Debt"\""," Year<=1991 ")/*
351   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
352   reg Debt CPG_01 if Year>=1991, robust
353   outreg, ctitle("","(8)"\"","Debt"\""," Year>=1991 ")/*
354   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
355   reg Debt CPG_01 if Year>1991 & Year<=2001, robust
356   outreg, ctitle("","(9)"\"","Debt"\"","Year>1991 & <=2001")/*
357   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
358   reg Debt CPG_01 if Year>2001, robust
359   outreg using data_Europe1, addtable pretext("\pagebreak") title(Table 4A:
Investigating Strategic Debt Hypothesis)/*
360   */ note("column (6) sample of Non-EU and Scandinavian countries; column (7) 
before Maastricht Treaty; column (8) after Maastricht Treaty; column (9) between 
Maastricht and Euro currency; column (10) after introduction of the Euro")/*
361   */ ctitle("","(10)"\"","Debt"\""," Year>2001 ") se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1)
summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ "N") summdec(4) merge
362   
363   ************************************************************************
364   * 3.1.2 Examining correlation between conservatism and economic growth *
365   ************************************************************************
366   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
367   reg Growth CPG_01, robust
368   outreg, ctitle("","(1)"\"","Growth"\""," Overall ")/*
369   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) replace
370   reg Growth CPG_01 if region==1, robust
371   outreg, ctitle("","(2)"\"","Growth"\""," Southern ")/*
372   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
373   reg Growth CPG_01 if region==2, robust
374   outreg, ctitle("","(3)"\"","Growth"\"","Middle-Western")/*
375   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
376   reg Growth CPG_01 if region==3, robust
377   outreg, ctitle("","(4)"\"","Growth"\"","Scandinavian")/*
378   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
379   reg Growth CPG_01 if region==4, robust
380   outreg, ctitle("","(5)"\"","Growth"\"","  Non-EU  ")/*
381   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
382   reg Growth CPG_01 if region>=3, robust
383   outreg, ctitle("","(6)"\"","Growth"\"","Non-EU & Scan")/*
384   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
385   reg Growth CPG_01 if Year<=1991, robust
386   outreg, ctitle("","(7)"\"","Growth"\""," Year<=1991")/*
387   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
388   reg Growth CPG_01 if Year>=1991, robust
389   outreg, ctitle("","(8)"\"","Growth"\""," Year>=1991")/*
390   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
391   reg Growth CPG_01 if Year>1991 & Year<=2001, robust
392   outreg, ctitle("","(9)"\"","Growth"\"","Year>1991 & <=2001")/*
393   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
394   reg Growth CPG_01 if Year>2001, robust
395   outreg using data_Europe1, addtable pretext("","") title(Table 4B: Conservatism and
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Economic Growth)/*
396   */ note("column (6) sample of Non-EU and Scandinavian countries; column (7) 
before Maastricht Treaty; column (8) after Maastricht Treaty; column (9) between 
Maastricht and Euro currency; column (10) after introduction of the Euro")/*
397   */ ctitle("","(10)"\"","Growth"\"","Year>2001") se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1)
summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ "N") summdec(4) merge
398   
399   
400   ******************************************************************************
401   * 3.2.1 Examining relationship between debt share and political competition *
402   ******************************************************************************
403   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
404   *gen Comp = (abs(Seats_share - (1/Parties)))*(-1)
405   *Figure 7 ///
406   gen year=.
407   local k=1950
408   local i=1959
409   local j=1
410   while `i' <= 2010 {
411   replace year=`j' if (Year<=`i'&Year>=`k')
412   local i = `i' + 1
413   local k = `k' + 1
414   local j = `j' + 1
415   }
416   sort Country year Year
417   egen dec=min(Year), by(Country year)
418   collapse (mean) Comp, by(region dec)
419   reshape wide Comp, i (dec) j(region)
420   rename Comp1 so
421   rename Comp2 mw
422   rename Comp3 sc
423   rename Comp4 ne
424   label variable dec ""
425   label variable so "Southern"
426   label variable ne "Non-EU"
427   label variable mw "Middle-Western"
428   label variable sc "Scandinavia"
429   # delimit ;
430   scatter so mw sc ne dec, title("Figure 7: Average Political Competition by regions",
margin(medsmall) size(large))
431   ytitle("Comp", margin(small) size(medsmall))
432   xtitle("Year", margin(small) size(medsmall))
433   xlabel(1950 "1950" 1960 "1960" 1970 "1970"
434   1980 "1980" 1990 "1990" 2000 "2000" 2010 "2010")
435   msize(medium medium medium medium) msymbol(none none none none) mcolor(dark_blue green
maroon dark_orange)
436   connect(l l l l);
437   
438   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
439   reg Debt Comp, robust
440   outreg, ctitle("","(1)"\"","Debt"\"","Overall")/*
441   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) replace
442   reg Debt Comp if region==1, robust
443   outreg, ctitle("","(2)"\"","Debt"\""," Southern ")/*
444   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
445   reg Debt Comp if region==2, robust
446   outreg, ctitle("","(3)"\"","Debt"\"","Middle-Western")/*
447   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
448   reg Debt Comp if region==3, robust
449   outreg, ctitle("","(4)"\"","Debt"\"","Scandinavian")/*
450   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
451   reg Debt Comp if region==4, robust
452   outreg, ctitle("","(5)"\"","Debt"\"","  Non-EU  ")/*
453   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
454   reg Debt Comp if region>=3, robust
455   outreg, ctitle("","(6)"\"","Debt"\"","Non-EU & Scan")/*
456   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
457   reg Debt Comp if Year<=1991, robust
458   outreg, ctitle("","(7)"\"","Debt"\""," Year<=1991 ")/*
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459   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
460   reg Debt Comp if Year>=1991, robust
461   outreg, ctitle("","(8)"\"","Debt"\""," Year>=1991 ")/*
462   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
463   reg Debt Comp if Year>1991 & Year<=2001, robust
464   outreg, ctitle("","(9)"\"","Debt"\"","Year>1991 & <=2001")/*
465   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
466   reg Debt Comp if Year>2001, robust
467   outreg using data_Europe1, addtable pretext("\pagebreak") title(Table 5A: Relation
between Debt Share and Political Competition)/*
468   */ note("column (6) sample of Non-EU and Scandinavian countries; column (7) 
before Maastricht Treaty; column (8) after Maastricht Treaty; column (9) between 
Maastricht and Euro currency; column (10) after introduction of the Euro")/*
469   */ ctitle("","(10)"\"","Debt"\""," Year>2001 ") se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1)
summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ "N") summdec(4) merge
470   
471   *************************************************************************
472   * 3.2.2 Correlation between economic activity and political environment *
473   *************************************************************************
474   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
475   reg Growth Comp, robust
476   outreg, ctitle("","(1)"\"","Growth"\""," Overall ")/*
477   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) replace
478   reg Growth Comp if region==1, robust
479   outreg, ctitle("","(2)"\"","Growth"\""," Southern ")/*
480   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
481   reg Growth Comp if region==2, robust
482   outreg, ctitle("","(3)"\"","Growth"\"","Middle-Western")/*
483   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
484   reg Growth Comp if region==3, robust
485   outreg, ctitle("","(4)"\"","Growth"\"","Scandinavian")/*
486   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
487   reg Growth Comp if region==4, robust
488   outreg, ctitle("","(5)"\"","Growth"\"","  Non-EU  ")/*
489   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
490   reg Growth Comp if region>=3, robust
491   outreg, ctitle("","(6)"\"","Growth"\"","Non-EU & Scan")/*
492   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
493   reg Growth Comp if Year<=1991, robust
494   outreg, ctitle("","(7)"\"","Growth"\""," Year<=1991")/*
495   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
496   reg Growth Comp if Year>=1991, robust
497   outreg, ctitle("","(8)"\"","Growth"\""," Year>=1991")/*
498   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
499   reg Growth Comp if Year>1991 & Year<=2001, robust
500   outreg, ctitle("","(9)"\"","Growth"\"","Year>1991 & <=2001")/*
501   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
502   reg Growth Comp if Year>2001, robust
503   outreg using data_Europe1, addtable pretext("","") title(Table 5B: Competition and
Economic Growth)/*
504   */ note("column (6) sample of Non-EU and Scandinavian countries; column (7) 
before Maastricht Treaty; column (8) after Maastricht Treaty; column (9) between 
Maastricht and Euro currency; column (10) after introduction of the Euro")/*
505   */ ctitle("","(10)"\"","Growth"\"","Year>2001") se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1)
summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ "N") summdec(4) merge
506   
507   ****************************************************
508   * 4.1 Evolution of debt, taxes and social spending *
509   ****************************************************
510   *Figure 8: Expenditures*
511   drop if Year <1995
512   gen year=.
513   local k=1995
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514   local i=1996
515   local j=1
516   while `i' <= 2010 {
517   replace year=`j' if (Year<=`i'&Year>=`k')
518   local i = `i' + 1
519   local k = `k' + 1
520   local j = `j' + 1
521   }
522   sort Country year Year
523   egen dec=min(Year), by(Country year)
524   collapse (mean) expenditure, by(region dec)
525   reshape wide expenditure, i (dec) j(region)
526   rename expenditure1 so_mw_sc_ne
527   label variable dec ""
528   label variable so_mw_sc_ne ""
529   # delimit ;
530   scatter so_mw_sc_ne dec, title("Panel A: Average Expenditure share of GDP", margin(
medsmall) size(large))
531   ytitle("Expenditure share", margin(small) size(medsmall))
532   xtitle("Year", margin(small) size(medsmall))
533   xlabel(1995 "1995" 2000 "2000" 2005 "2005"
534   2010 "2010")
535   msize(medium) msymbol(none none none none) mcolor(mint)
536   connect(l);
537   
538   *Figure 8: R&D*
539   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
540   drop if Year <1995
541   gen year=.
542   local k=1995
543   local i=1996
544   local j=1
545   while `i' <= 2010 {
546   replace year=`j' if (Year<=`i'&Year>=`k')
547   local i = `i' + 1
548   local k = `k' + 1
549   local j = `j' + 1
550   }
551   sort Country year Year
552   egen dec=min(Year), by(Country year)
553   collapse (mean) rd, by(region dec)
554   reshape wide rd, i (dec) j(region)
555   rename rd1 so_mw_sc_ne
556   label variable dec ""
557   label variable so_mw_sc_ne ""
558   # delimit ;
559   scatter so_mw_sc_ne dec, title("Panel B: Average R&D share of GDP", margin(medsmall) size(
large))
560   ytitle("R&D share", margin(small) size(medsmall))
561   xtitle("Year", margin(small) size(medsmall))
562   xlabel(1995 "1995" 2000 "2000" 2005 "2005"
563   2010 "2010")
564   msize(medium) msymbol(none none none none)
565   connect(l);
566   
567   *Figure 8: Taxes*
568   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
569   drop if Year<1965
570   gen year=.
571   local k=1965
572   local i=1966
573   local j=1
574   while `i' <= 2010 {
575   replace year=`j' if (Year<=`i'&Year>=`k')
576   local i = `i' + 1
577   local k = `k' + 1
578   local j = `j' + 1
579   }
580   sort Country year Year
581   egen dec=min(Year), by(Country year)
582   collapse (mean) taxrevenue, by(region dec)
583   reshape wide taxrevenue, i (dec) j(region)
584   rename taxrevenue1 so_mw_sc_ne
585   label variable dec ""
586   label variable so_mw_sc_ne ""
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587   # delimit ;
588   scatter so_mw_sc_ne dec, title("Panel C: Average Tax revenue as share of GDP", margin(
medsmall) size(large))
589   ytitle("Tax share", margin(small) size(medsmall))
590   xtitle("Year", margin(small) size(medsmall))
591   xlabel(1965 "1965" 1970 "1970" 1975 "1975" 1980 "1980" 1985 "1985" 1990 "1990" 1995 "1995"
2000 "2000" 2005 "2005"
592   2010 "2010")
593   msize(medium) msymbol(none none none none)
594   connect(l);
595   
596   *Figure 8: Debt*
597   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
598   drop if Year<1965
599   gen year=.
600   local k=1965
601   local i=1966
602   local j=1
603   while `i' <= 2010 {
604   replace year=`j' if (Year<=`i'&Year>=`k')
605   local i = `i' + 1
606   local k = `k' + 1
607   local j = `j' + 1
608   }
609   sort Country year Year
610   egen dec=min(Year), by(Country year)
611   collapse (mean) Debt, by(region dec)
612   reshape wide Debt, i (dec) j(region)
613   rename Debt1 so_mw_sc_ne
614   label variable dec ""
615   label variable so_mw_sc_ne ""
616   # delimit ;
617   scatter so_mw_sc_ne dec, title("Panel D: Average Debt as share of GDP", margin(medsmall)
size(large))
618   ytitle("Debt share", margin(small) size(medsmall))
619   xtitle("Year", margin(small) size(medsmall))
620   xlabel(1965 "1965" 1970 "1970" 1975 "1975" 1980 "1980" 1985 "1985" 1990 "1990" 1995 "1995"
2000 "2000" 2005 "2005"
621   2010 "2010")
622   msize(medium) msymbol(none none none none)
623   connect(l);
624   
625   use "C:\Users\Chrisi\Desktop\Masteroppgave 15.03.2014\data_Europe.dta", clear
626   reg expenditure Debt, robust
627   outreg, ctitle("","(1)"\"","Expenditure")/*
628   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) replace
629   reg rd Debt, robust
630   outreg, ctitle("","(2)"\"","  R&D  ")/*
631   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
632   reg taxrevenue Debt, robust
633   outreg using data_Europe1, addtable pretext("\pagebreak") title(Table 6A: Relation
between Debt and Public Finances) ctitle("","(3)"\"","Taxrevenue")/*
634   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
635   ///DO NOT INCLUDE ///
636   corr Debt expenditure Growth taxrevenue rd
637   
638   reg Debt L.taxrevenue, robust
639   outreg, ctitle("","(1)"\"","Debt")/*
640   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) replace
641   reg Debt L.rd, robust
642   outreg, ctitle("","(1)"\"","Debt")/*
643   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
644   reg Debt L.expenditure, robust
645   outreg using data_Europe1, addtable pretext("\pagebreak") title(Table 6B: Relation
between Debt and Public Finances (lagged values)) ctitle("","(1)"\"","Debt")/*
646   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
647   
648   *************************************************************************************
649   * 4.2 Are conservatives more likely to comply with the shrinking government effect? *
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650   *************************************************************************************
651   reg Growth CPG_01, robust
652   outreg, ctitle("","(1)"\""," Growth ")/*
653   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) replace
654   reg Growth rd_share, robust
655   outreg, ctitle("","(2)"\""," Growth ")/*
656   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
657   reg Growth CPG_01 rd_share, robust
658   outreg using data_Europe1, addtable pretext("","") title("Table 7A: Preferences as 
Determinant of Growth") ctitle("","(3)"\""," Growth ")/*
659   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
660   *story behind no growth effect of R&D, conditional on CPG
661   *if expenditure up, for given R&D, then R&D share down
662   reg rd_share expenditure, robust
663   outreg, ctitle("","(1)"\"","R&D Share")/*
664   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) replace
665   reg rd_share Debt, robust
666   outreg, ctitle("","(2)"\"","R&D Share")/*
667   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
668   *if tax revenues move in same direction...
669   *Figure 9A ///
670   graph twoway (lfit taxrevenue expenditure) (scatter taxrevenue expenditure)
671   *...then, given that R&D positively correlated with taxes
672   reg rd taxrevenue, robust
673   outreg, ctitle("","(3)"\""," R&D ")/*
674   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
675   *R&D share should up
676   reg rd_share taxrevenue, robust
677   outreg using data_Europe1, addtable pretext("","") title("Table 7B: Influence of 
Public Finances on R&D as Share of Expenditure")/*
678   */note("column (3) has R&D as Share of GDP as dependent variable") ctitle("","(4)"\"",
"R&D Share") se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2"
\ "N") summdec(4) merge
679   *so, there are 2 effects of different sign and almost same size
680   *--> effect on growth should be close to zero and/or not significant
681   *reg Growth rd_share, robust
682   reg taxrevenue CPG_01, robust
683   outreg, ctitle("","(1)"\"","Taxrevenue")/*
684   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) replace
685   reg Debt CPG_01, robust
686   outreg, ctitle("","(2)"\""," Debt ")/*
687   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
688   reg expenditure CPG_01, robust
689   outreg, ctitle("","(3)"\"","Expenditure")/*
690   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
691   reg rd CPG_01, robust
692   outreg using data_Europe1, addtable pretext("","") title("Table 7C: Preferences by 
Conservatism I") ctitle("","(4)"\"","  R&D  ")/*
693   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
694   *so, since more liberal implies higher taxes and less debt, less overall and more R&D 
spending --> preference for R&D
695   *while the opposite is true for conservatives,
696   *the opposing effects on growth, both direct from CPG and indirect through R&D, cancel 
out in a balanced sample  
697   *sign on R&D coefficient: R&D share up if debt down or taxes up
698   *since liberal have preference for R&D, it must be that taxes go up, which by itself 
reduces growth until technology improvements break through
699   *Figure 9B ///
700   graph twoway (lfit Growth taxrevenue) (scatter Growth taxrevenue)
701   *on the other hand, even though not significant, coefficient on CPG positive --> more 
liberal more growth-enhancing spending decisions in the longer run
702   
703   ************************************************
704   * Section 4.3 What is the role of competition? *
705   ************************************************
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706   *Competition on public finance
707   reg taxrevenue Comp, robust
708   outreg, ctitle("","(1)"\"","Taxrevenue")/*
709   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) replace
710   reg Debt Comp, robust
711   outreg, ctitle("","(2)"\""," Debt ")/*
712   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
713   reg expenditure Comp, robust
714   outreg, ctitle("","(3)"\"","Expenditure")/*
715   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
716   reg rd Comp, robust
717   outreg, ctitle("","(4)"\"","  R&D  ")/*
718   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
719   reg Growth Comp, robust
720   outreg, ctitle("","(5)"\""," Growth ")/*
721   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
722   reg Growth Debt expenditure rd taxrevenue CPG_01 Comp, robust,
723   outreg using data_Europe1, addtable pretext("","") title("Table 8: Impact of 
Competition I") ctitle("","(6)"\""," Growth ")/*
724   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
725   
726   
727   *check BB --> no linear relationship
728   *gen budget = Debt/taxrevenue /// Figure 10 panel A to D
729   graph twoway (qfit Growth Debt)
730   graph twoway (qfit Growth taxrevenue)
731   graph twoway (qfit Growth budget)
732   graph twoway (qfit Growth expenditure)
733   graph twoway (qfit Growth rd)
734   
735   ***************************************************************************
736   * 5.2 Has the intuition been right? (including other political variables) *
737   ***************************************************************************
738   corr Growth Debt CPG_01 Comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share
739   reg Debt RfT ToG Freq Gov_share, robust
740   outreg, ctitle("","(1)"\""," Debt ")/*
741   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) replace
742   reg Debt CPG_01 Comp RfT Freq ToG Gov_share, robust
743   outreg, ctitle("","(2)"\""," Debt ")/*
744   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
745   reg Growth RfT ToG Freq Gov_share, robust
746   outreg, ctitle("","(3)"\"","Growth ")/*
747   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
748   reg Growth Debt CPG_01 Comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share, robust
749   outreg using data_Europe1, addtable pretext("\pagebreak") title(Table 9: Including
other political variables) ctitle("","(4)"\"","Growth")/*
750   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
751   
752   *************************************************
753   * Section 6.1 Tests for a better specification *
754   *************************************************
755   *OLS vs. RE --> evidence of significant differences between countries
756   xtreg Growth Debt L.Debt CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share, re robust
757   xttest0
758   *Hausman: FE vs. RE --> not reject H0, use RE
759   xtreg Growth Debt L.Debt CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share, fe
760   estimates store fixed
761   xtreg Growth Debt L.Debt CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share, re
762   estimates store random
763   hausman fixed random
764   *time fixed effects? - YES
765   xtreg Growth Debt L.Debt CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share i.Year, re
766   testparm i.Year
767   *contemporaneous correlation? - YES
768   xtreg Growth Debt L.Debt CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share, re robust
Correlation analysis* - Printed on 09.05.2014 09:26:44
Page 13
769   xtcsd, pesaran abs
770   
771   *************************************************
772   * Section 6.2 Robustness of linear correlations *
773   *************************************************
774   *Generate country and time dummies
775   *quietly tab Year, gen(yy) 
776   *quietly tab Country, gen(ctrydum)
777   
778   * preference for expenditure variables, debt & growth w/ year, country, region fixed 
effects
779   qui reg taxrevenue CPG_01 yy* i.region ctrydum2-ctrydum16, cluster(Country)
780   outreg, keep(CPG_01 _cons) ctitle("","(1)"\"","Taxrevenue")/*
781   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) replace
782   qui reg Debt CPG_01 yy* i.region ctrydum2-ctrydum16, cluster(Country)
783   outreg, keep(CPG_01 _cons) ctitle("","(2)"\""," Debt ")/*
784   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
785   qui reg expenditure CPG_01 yy* i.region ctrydum2-ctrydum16, cluster(Country)
786   outreg, keep(CPG_01 _cons) ctitle("","(3)"\"","Expenditure")/*
787   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
788   qui reg rd CPG_01 yy* i.region ctrydum2-ctrydum16, cluster(Country)
789   outreg, keep(CPG_01 _cons) ctitle("","(4)"\"","  R&D  ")/*
790   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
791   qui reg Growth CPG_01 yy* i.region ctrydum2-ctrydum16, cluster(Country)
792   outreg using data_Europe1, keep(CPG_01 _cons) addtable pretext("\pagebreak") title(
"Table 10A: Preferences by Conservatism II") ctitle("","(5)"\""," Growth")/*
793   */note("Coefficients for Year, Country and Region dummies not shown") se
squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ "N") summdec(4)
merge
794   
795   * competition and expenditure variables, debt & growth w/ year, country, region fixed 
effects
796   qui reg taxrevenue Comp yy* i.region ctrydum2-ctrydum16, cluster(Country)
797   outreg, keep(Comp _cons) ctitle("","(1)"\"","Taxrevenue")/*
798   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) replace
799   qui reg Debt Comp yy* i.region ctrydum2-ctrydum16, cluster(Country)
800   outreg, keep(Comp _cons) ctitle("","(2)"\""," Debt ")/*
801   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
802   qui reg expenditure Comp yy* i.region ctrydum2-ctrydum16, cluster(Country)
803   outreg, keep(Comp _cons) ctitle("","(3)"\"","Expenditure")/*
804   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
805   qui reg rd Comp yy* i.region ctrydum2-ctrydum16 , cluster(Country)
806   outreg, keep(Comp _cons) ctitle("","(4)"\"","  R&D  ")/*
807   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
808   qui reg Growth Comp yy* i.region ctrydum2-ctrydum16, cluster(Country)
809   outreg using data_Europe1, keep(Comp _cons) addtable pretext("","") title("Table 10B: 
Impact of Competition II") ctitle("","(5)"\""," Growth ")/*
810   */note("Coefficients for Year, Country and Region dummies not shown") se
squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ "N") summdec(4)
merge
811   
812   * including the other political variables w/ fixed effects and interaction of CPG and Comp
813   * creating Maastrich dummy
814   *gen MT=0
815   *replace MT=1 if Year>=1991
816   *replace MT=0 if Num==5
817   *replace MT=0 if Num==14
818   *replace MT=0 if Num>=17
819   *gen MT_dum_1 = MT*CPG_01
820   *gen MT_dum_2 = MT*Comp
821   qui reg Debt L.Debt L.Growth CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp yy* i.region MT_dum_1 MT_dum_2 ctrydum2-
ctrydum16 , cluster(Country)
822   outreg, keep(L.Debt L.Growth CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp _cons) ctitle("","(1)"\""," Debt ")/*
823   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) replace
824   qui reg Debt L.Debt L.Growth CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share yy* i.region
MT_dum_1 MT_dum_2 ctrydum2-ctrydum16 , cluster(Country)
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825   outreg, keep(L.Debt L.Growth CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share _cons) ctitle
("","(2)"\""," Debt ")/*
826   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
827   qui reg Growth L.Growth Debt L.Debt CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp yy* i.region MT_dum_1 MT_dum_2
ctrydum2-ctrydum16, cluster(Country)
828   outreg, keep(L.Debt L.Growth CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp _cons) ctitle("","(3)"\""," Growth")
/*
829   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
830   qui reg Growth L.Growth Debt L.Debt CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share yy* i.
region MT_dum_1 MT_dum_2 ctrydum2-ctrydum16, cluster(Country)
831   outreg, keep(Debt L.Debt L.Growth CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share _cons)
ctitle("","(4)"\""," Growth")/*
832   */se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
833   
834   * Using GDP/capita *
835   corr L.GDP_cap GDP_cap F.GDP_cap Growth Debt L.expenditure expenditure F.expenditure
836   reg expenditure L.GDP_cap, robust
837   qui reg Debt L.GDP_cap expenditure CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share yy* i.
region MT_dum_1 MT_dum_2 ctrydum2-ctrydum16 , cluster(Country)
838   outreg, keep(L.GDP_cap expenditure CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share _cons)
ctitle("","(5)"\""," Debt ")/*
839   */ se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
840   qui reg Growth L.GDP_cap expenditure CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share yy* i.
region MT_dum_1 MT_dum_2 ctrydum2-ctrydum16, cluster(Country)
841   outreg , keep(L.GDP_cap expenditure CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share _cons)
ctitle("","(6)"\""," Growth")/*
842   */se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
843   qui reg Growth L.GDP_cap CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share yy* i.region MT_dum_1
MT_dum_2 ctrydum2-ctrydum16, cluster(Country)
844   outreg using data_Europe1, keep(L.GDP_cap CPG_01 Comp CPG_comp RfT ToG Freq Gov_share
_cons) ctitle("","(7)"\""," Growth")/*
845   */ addtable pretext("\pagebreak") title(Table 11A: Regressions with Fixed Effects)
note("Coefficients for Year, Country and Region dummies not shown")/*
846   */se squarebrack starlevels(5 2 1) summstat(r2_a \ N) summtitle("Adjusted R2" \ 
"N") summdec(4) merge
847   
848   *Figure 12: GDP/capita over time
849   gen year=.
850   local k=1950
851   local i=1951
852   local j=1
853   while `i' <= 2010 {
854   replace year=`j' if (Year<=`i'&Year>=`k')
855   local i = `i' + 1
856   local k = `k' + 1
857   local j = `j' + 1
858   }
859   sort Country year Year
860   egen dec=min(Year), by(Country year)
861   collapse (mean) taxrevenue, by(region dec)
862   reshape wide taxrevenue, i (dec) j(region)
863   rename taxrevenue1 so
864   rename taxrevenue2 mw
865   rename taxrevenue3 sc
866   rename taxrevenue4 ne
867   label variable dec ""
868   label variable so ""
869   label variable mw ""
870   label variable sc ""
871   label variable ne ""
872   # delimit ;
873   scatter so mw sc ne dec, title("Figure 12: Average GDP per Capita", margin(medsmall) size(
large))
874   ytitle("GDP/capita", margin(small) size(medsmall))
875   xtitle("Year", margin(small) size(medsmall))
876   xlabel(1950 "1950" 1960 "1960" 1970 "1970" 1980 "1980" 1990 "1990" 2000 "2000"
877   2010 "2010")
878   msize(medium) msymbol(none none none none)
879   connect(l);
